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THE CAFA MASS ACTION NUMEROSITY
REQUIREMENT: THREE PROBLEMS WITH
COUNTING TO 100
Guyon Knight*
This Note examines the mass action provision of the Class Action
Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA) and the difficulties courts have encountered
when applying its seemingly simple 100-person numerosity requirement.
"Mass actions" are a broad category of nonclass aggregate litigation over
which CAFA extended federal jurisdiction. This Note examines three
interpretations of the numerosity requirement advanced in recent cases.
These interpretations have advocated, in turn, not finding a mass action
when a case has more than 100 formally joined plaintiffs, recognizing the
existence of a single mass action broken up among parallel suits with fewer
than 100 plaintiffs, and finding a mass action in cases with only a single,
representational plaintiff. These arguments concerning the meaning of the
mass action numerosity requirement stem from the confluence of three
factors: Congress's intent for courts to interpret CAFA broadly, the
similarities between class actions and nonclass aggregate litigation, and
ambiguities in the mass action statute. Although no perfect reading of the
statute is possible, this Note suggests that courts strictly interpret the
statute going forward, only counting formal parties to a single action in
order to determine if CAFA 's numerosity threshold has been achieved.
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INTRODUCTION
Counting to 100 should be simple. However, in the context of the Class
Action Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA, or the Act)1 and "mass actions" this
exercise is considerably more complicated. This Note examines the sources
of the difficulty in assessing the numerosity requirement of CAFA mass
actions, and cases where courts have wrestled with the meaning of the
number 100.
As opposed to CAFA's main concern-class actions-mass actions are
nonclass aggregate litigation. CAFA defines mass actions, in brief, as "any
civil action ... in which monetary relief claims of 100 or more persons are
proposed to be tried jointly on the ground that the plaintiffs' claims involve
common questions of law or fact."' 2 CAFA did not invent this breed of
nonclass aggregation, but it formally recognized it and extended federal
jurisdiction over these cases.3
CAFA's mass action provision was born from the realization that, despite
their formal differences, nonclass aggregate litigation can resemble "class
1. Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
2. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(1 1)(B)(i) (2006).
3. See infra Part I.A.
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actions in disguise." 4 Thus, according to Congress, the evils inherent in
class actions that CAFA hoped to eliminate were equally present in mass
actions. 5 In both, plaintiffs' lawyers could game the procedural system to
the detriment of their client and, most importantly for Congress,
defendants. 6 Congress's prescription for mass actions was the same that
they applied to class actions: a broad grant of federal jurisdiction over this
breed of nonclass aggregate litigation. 7 Furthermore, Congress intended
courts to interpret its grant of federal jurisdiction as broadly as possible.8
While Congress made its intentions clear, the mass action statute is not.
The confluence of Congress's broad intent, the similarities between class
and nonclass aggregate litigation, and the statute's ambiguous language
make even the seemingly simple task of counting to 100 a subject of
considerable conflict. That conflict centers upon two specific ambiguous
phrases in the mass action statute: "claims of ... persons" and "proposed
to be tried jointly." 9 Part I of this Note outlines these sources of difficulties
in applying the mass action's numerosity requirement.
In Part II, this Note examines three lines of cases that have attempted to
apply CAFA's ambiguous language. In the cases of Bullard v. Burlington
Northern Santa Fe Railway Co. 10 and Cooper v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco
Co., I I courts rejected the argument that formally joining more than 100
parties to a complaint does not satisfy the mass action's "proposed to be
tried jointly" requirement. This Note argues in Part III that the courts in
these cases were correct to dismiss this argument. However, even the
relatively clear application of the statute in these cases can lead to bizarre
results. In Cooper, the defendant's litigation strategy could have potentially
resulted in a mass action made up of individual trials for more than 100
plaintiffs. By contrast, in Tanoh v. Dow Chemical Co., 12 plaintiffs
advanced the argument that joining ninety-nine plaintiffs in parallel actions
did not trigger the "proposed to be tried jointly" requirement, despite the
fact that, considered as a single case, the claims would clearly constitute a
mass action. This Note argues that the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit correctly ruled in the plaintiffs' favor in Tanoh. However, a strict
reading of CAFA's language in that case left cases of "national importance"
in state court, contrary to Congress's intent. 13
4. S. REP. No. 109-14, at 47 (2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 44; see also
infra note 85 and accompanying text.
5. See infra Part I.C.2.
6. See infra notes 47-53, 85-87 and accompanying text.
7. See infra Part I.B, C.1.
8. See infra Part I.B, C.2.
9. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(1 1)(B)(i) (2006).
10. 535 F.3d 759 (7th Cir. 2008); see also infra Part II.A. 1.
11. 586 F. Supp. 2d 1312 (M.D. Fla. 2008); see also infra Part II.A.2.
12. 561 F.3d 945 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 187 (2009); see also infra Part 11.13.
13. Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, § 2(b)(2), 119 Stat. 4, 5; see
also infra Part I.B.
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Finally, in Louisiana ex rel. Caldwell v. Allstate Insurance Co., 14 the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit examined the meaning of
CAFA's phrase "claims of . . . persons." In Caldwell, the defendants
argued that a court could count nonparties as "persons" in order to satisfy
the mass action numerosity requirement. The Fifth Circuit accepted that
argument and held that the "real parties in interest" in a parens patriae
action were equivalent to the mass action provision's "claims of...
persons." Although one court has appeared to agree with Caldwell's
reasoning, other courts have rejected this argument in similar cases and
refused to look past the formal parties to an action in order to count 100
"persons." 15 This Note argues that these courts have interpreted the statute
correctly and that Caldwell reached the wrong result.
The arguments advanced in these cases are made possible by CAFA's
two key ambiguities: "claims of. . .persons" and "proposed to be tried
jointly." In Part 111, this Note suggests readings of these two phrases that
clarify the mass action numerosity requirement and appropriately limit its
reach going forward. This Note argues that "claims of ... persons" should
be read to apply solely to parties-a reading that best comports with the
language of the statute as a whole and with the intent of Congress. As for
"proposed to be tried jointly," this Note argues that courts should limit their
inquiry to claims that are formally part of a single action or have been
properly consolidated. While this proposed reading would not capture all
of the cases of national importance that Congress sought to bring into
federal court, this interpretation is the most coherent reading of the statute
as a whole. However, this Note concludes with a more fundamental
realization prompted by the mass action's numerosity provision: it is
unworkable. The same lack of formal structure that spawned CAFA's mass
action provision makes it impossible to capture the flexible category of
nonclass aggregate litigation with any clear rule. In CAFA mass actions,
the clarity and simplicity of the number 100 is an illusion.
I. AGGREGATE LITIGATION, CAFA, AND MASS ACTIONS
The problems courts have encountered in applying the mass action
numerosity requirement stem from three sources: the fundamental
similarities between class actions and nonclass aggregate litigation,
Congress's clear intent that CAFA and the mass action be interpreted
broadly, and the mass action statute's ambiguous language. This part
introduces these three sources of the arguments examined in Part II. This
part first gives an overview of aggregate litigation, some of the problems it
presents, and the underlying similarities between formal class actions and
nonclass aggregate litigation. This part then turns to CAFA and introduces
the statute. Next, this part examines the mass action provision in detail,
including its legislative history. This part concludes with a closer
14. 536 F.3d 418 (5th Cir. 2008); see also infra Part II.C. 1.
15. See infra Part II.C.2.
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examination of the ambiguities in the mass action provision that have given
rise to the cases discussed in Part II-specifically, "claims of... persons"
and "proposed to be tried jointly."
A. Aggregate Litigation: An Overview
In simplest terms, aggregate litigation "is a single lawsuit that
encompasses claims or defenses held by multiple parties or represented
persons."' 16 Beneath the surface of this broad definition, though, lies a
multitude of formal and informal mechanisms bringing together the claims
of parties and nonparties both inside and outside of court. 17 In all of these
forms of aggregation, participants surrender some degree of control over the
litigation of their claims. 18 Significant differences exist, however, in the
law's treatment of these minimally involved persons-most strikingly,
between the handling of class actions versus nonclass aggregate litigation.
Both of these broad categories of litigation share the problems begat by
absent or nonparticipatory parties. To counter these problems, class
litigation proceeds within a formal structure that assigns the court a
significant role in protecting the interests of absent claimants. The court,
however, does not have a formal role in managing these issues in the
panoply of nonclass aggregating devices that have evolved partly in
response to the procedural hurdles of class actions. This section introduces
these forms of aggregate litigation and the problems they present.
The modem Rule 23 was intended, in part, to encourage cases of small
individual value to be bundled together and brought into federal court
where federal judges could protect rights that state courts had not. 19 Under
the Rule's framework, nonparty plaintiffs can be bound by a court's ruling,
provided that their claims are adequately represented and suitable for class
adjudication. 20 However, ruling on the claims of absent parties presents
serious questions of due process and stands at "quite a distance from the
16. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION § 1.02(a) (Proposed Final Draft
2009).
17. See generally Howard M. Erichson, Informal Aggregation: Procedural and Ethical
Implications of Coordination Among Counsel in Related Lawsuits, 50 DUKE L.J. 381 (2000).
18. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding the Plaintiffs Attorney: The
Implications of Economic Theory for Private Enforcement of Law Through Class and
Derivative Actions, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 669, 677-84 (1986); Erichson, supra note 17, at
464-65.
19. See Stephen B. Burbank, The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 in Historical
Context: A Preliminary View, 156 U. PA. L. REv. 1439, 1485-89 (2008); Judith Resnik,
Lessons in Federalism from the 1960s Class Action Rule and the 2005 Class Action Fairness
Act: "The Political Safeguards" ofAggregate Translocal Actions, 156 U. PA. L. REv. 1929,
1938-44 (2008) (discussing the redrafting of Rule 23 in the 1960s and the drafters' intent).
On the history of class actions and representative litigation, see generally Stephen C.
Yeazell, Group Litigation and Social Context: Toward a History of the Class Action, 77
COLUM. L. REv. 866 (1977).
20. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)-(b).
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'day in court' ideal of Anglo-American jurisprudence." 2 1 The absence of
individual representation in class actions also opens the door to conflicts of
interest, both between attorneys and those they represent, and among
present and future claimants. 2 2
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Federal Rules, or Rules), and
courts applying them, display an overarching concern with the procedural
rights of these absent parties. 23 Rule 23 attempts to protect their interests
by giving judges an active role in scrutinizing the makeup of classes, class
claims, and the adequacy of representation, thereby managing potential
conflicts. 24 The U.S. Supreme Court has emphatically confirmed the
importance of this inquiry, even if the parties request class certification for
settlement only and never intended to go to trial.2 5 Judicial control thus
21. Samuel Issacharoff, Governance and Legitimacy in the Law of Class Actions, 1999
SuP. CT. REV. 337, 347-66 (discussing the due process issues of class actions and the limits
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for properly considering them); Samuel Issacharoff,
Preclusion, Due Process, and the Right To Opt Out of Class Actions, 77 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1057, 1058 (2002) [hereinafter Issacharoff, Preclusion]; see, e.g., Hansberry v. Lee,
311 U.S. 32, 42 (1940) ("[In class suits,] there has been a failure of due process only in those
cases where it cannot be said that the procedure adopted, fairly insures the protection of the
interests of absent parties who are to be bound by it." (citing Chi., Burlington & Quincy R.R.
v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 235 (1897))). But cf Owen M. Fiss, The Allure of Individualism,
78 IOWA L. REV. 965, 970-71 (1993) ("I believe that what the Constitution guarantees is not
a right of participation, but rather what I will call a 'right of representation': not a day in
court but the right to have one's interest adequately represented.").
22. See, e.g., JACK B. WEINSTEIN, INDIVIDUAL JUSTICE IN MASS TORT LITIGATION 61-66
(1995) (outlining conflicts, including the potential for conflict between present and future,
unrepresented claimants); John C. Coffee, Jr., The Regulation of Entrepreneurial Litigation:
Balancing Fairness and Efficiency in the Large Class Action, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 877, 896-
917 (1987) (describing practices of entrepreneurial plaintiffs' litigators and conflicts of
interests they implicate); Richard A. Nagareda, The Preexistence Principle and the Structure
of the Class Action, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 149, 163-67 (2003) (describing class counsel as
monopolistic, a dynamic that can place some high-value claimants at risk).
23. The concern with the due process rights of absent plaintiffs is especially visible
when nonparties are permitted to opt out of class litigation or settlement. See Phillips
Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 812 (1985) ("[Wle hold that due process requires at a
minimum that an absent plaintiff be provided with an opportunity to remove himself from
the class by executing and returning an 'opt out' or 'request for exclusion' form to the
court."); see also, e.g., Issacharoff, Preclusion, supra note 21, at 1058 ("[A] case can be
made that due process may be satisfied only when, as with the consent to personal
jurisdiction under Shutts, an absent class member is insured notice and the ability to opt
out."); Brian Wolfman & Alan B. Morrison, What the Shutts Opt-Out Right Is and What It
Ought To Be, 74 UMKC L. REV. 729, 742-43 (2006) ("Shutts' due process holding is best
understood as premised on each class member's property interest in a cause of action that, if
the class member so chooses, must be disposed of by the owner of that interest and not
someone else claiming to be the owner's representative.").
24. See FED. R. CIv. P. 23(c)(1)(A) ("[T]he court must determine by order whether to
certify the action as a class action."); see also John Bronsteen & Owen Fiss, The Class
Action Rule, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1419, 1423-34 (2003) (outlining FED. R. CIv. P.
23(a)-(c) and advocating the elimination of the "descriptive categories" of Rule 23: limited
funds and the risk of inconsistent adjudication).
25. See Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 620 (1997) ("[O]ther
specifications of [Rule 23]-those designed to protect absentees by blocking unwarranted or
overbroad class definitions-demand undiluted, even heightened, attention in the settlement
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acts as a champion for the interests of absent parties by, in part, serving as a
surrogate for client consent.26
However, not all aggregate litigation is class litigation. The Federal
Rules and procedural statutes provide other means to bind a large number
of parties, 27 including joinder,28 interpleader, 29 Multidistrict Litigation
(MDL), 30 consolidation, 3 1 and multiparty, multiforum litigation. 32  In
addition, enterprising lawyers have aggregated parties and claims in
numerous ways outside of the formal constraints of the Federal Rules. 3 3
This array of nonclass aggregating techniques has evolved partially in
response to the perceived limitations of the class device, brought on by the
very judicial due process scrutiny that allows the class action to be used
context. Such attention is of vital importance, for a court asked to certify a settlement class
will lack the opportunity, present when a case is litigated, to adjust the class, informed by the
proceedings as they unfold."); see also FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e) (settlement of class actions).
26. See, e.g., Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Procedural Justice in Nonclass Aggregation,
44 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 1, 41-42 (2009).
27. See Elizabeth J. Cabraser, The Class Action Counterreformation, 57 STAN. L. REV.
1475, 1485-99 (2005) (discussing forms of nonclass joinder).
28. FED. R. Civ. P. 19-20.
29. 28 U.S.C. § 1335 (2006); FED. R. CIv. P. 22.
30. 28 U.S.C. § 1407.
31. FED. R. Civ. P. 42(a). This Rule allows the trial court, at its discretion, to consolidate
actions pending "before the court" that involve a common question of law or fact. See id.
The court may consolidate for "hearing or trial [of] any or all matters at issue in the actions."
FED. R. Civ. P. 42(a)(1). Courts have held that cases improperly removed from state court
are not "before the court" and thus may not be consolidated pursuant to the Rule. See, e.g.,
U.S. ex rel. Owens-Coming Fiberglass Corp. v. Brandt Constr. Co., 826 F.2d 643, 647 (7th
Cir. 1987); Lecker v. Bayer Corp., No. 09-991-GPM, 2010 WL 148627, at *4 (S.D. Ill. Jan.
13, 2010) ("[A] federal court can neither acquire subject matter jurisdiction through
consolidation of cases nor consolidate cases as to which it lacks such jurisdiction."); Mourik
Int'l B.V. v. Reactor Servs. Int'l, Inc., 182 F. Supp. 2d 599, 602 (S.D. Tex. 2002) ("Because
the removal was improper, this Court's consolidation order was also improvident.").
32. 28 U.S.C. § 1369.
33. See Erichson, supra note 17, at 386-408 (describing nonclass aggregating
techniques); see also Howard M. Erichson, Beyond the Class Action: Lawyer Loyalty and
Client Autonomy in Non-class Collective Representation, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 519, 530-
43 [hereinafter Erichson, Beyond the Class Action] (same). For an early account of informal
coordination on mass tort cases, see Paul D. Rheingold, The Development of Litigation
Groups, 6 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 1 (1982).
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fairly. 34 These alternate forms of aggregation have developed even though
Rule 23 has been stretched far beyond the uses intended by its framers. 35
The innovative nonclass aggregation devices that lawyers have dreamed
up do not share the procedural hurdles contained in Rule 23, but they do
share many of the challenges and conflicts of class actions. Once the
number of parties to a suit is large enough, even nonclass mass litigation
"tends toward de facto class litigation. . . .in the sense that plaintiffs'
outcomes depend upon the work of lawyers who seek to maximize the
aggregate recovery, and with whom most plaintiffs have no meaningful
individual relationship." 36 It is no simple task to gain the imprimatur of
informed client consent for this type of aggregation. Firstly, individual
claims are frequently scouted out by small-scale firms, then passed along to
the primary lawyer on the case, with whom the individual plaintiffs have no
relationship. 37 Moreover, the notion of consent in nonclass aggregation is
inherently problematic since a lawyer may think it wise to act in the best
interests of the group as a whole, not the individual consenting plaintiffs. 38
The limits of client consent and control are especially clear in aggregate
settlement, where conditions of a settlement deal can lead to client coercion
and where individual parties can affect the dispositions of others' claims
with a form of veto power. 39
34. See, e.g., Cabraser, supra note 27, at 1481 ("Utterly absent from Rhone-Poulenc's
diatribe against class certification was any recognition that the victims had corresponding
rights. Indeed, Rhone-Poulenc and its progeny exhibited no consciousness that consigning
common issues to individual adjudication denies due process to the victims of mass wrongs."
(discussing In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293 (7th Cir. 1995))). In a
forthcoming article, Professor Richard Nagareda argues that the evolution of aggregate
litigation is, in part, an inevitable result of the limits of the class action as a procedural
device. See Richard A. Nagareda, Embedded Aggregation in Civil Litigation, 95 CORNELL L.
REV. (forthcoming Sept. 2010) (manuscript at 8-9), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1506460. Nagareda, however, does not
see these limits as "hypertechnical bugaboos," but rather as a proper reaction to the
bargaining disparity of the class action device. See id.
35. See, e.g., Judith Resnik, From "Cases" to "Litigation," LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.,
Summer 1991, at 5, 9-17 (noting that mass torts have become a staple of class action
litigation, although Rule 23's framers stated that such cases were inappropriate for class
disposition).
36. Erichson, Beyond the Class Action, supra note 33, at 526.
37. See id. at 532-39.
38. See id. at 553-75 (arguing that lawyers should conceive of their ethical duty as
running towards the group as a whole but also allow the client autonomy at the outset and
settlement of litigation).
39. See Howard M. Erichson, A Typology of Aggregate Settlements, 80 NOTRE DAME L.
REv. 1769, 1792-95 (2005) (outlining a range of settlement types based on the percentage of
consenting claimants required to finalize the agreement); Samuel Issacharoff & Robert H.
Klonoff, The Public Value of Settlement, 78 FORDHAM L. REv. 1177, 1185 (2009) ("[I]f
anything, the problem with large nonclass cases may well be not the perceived lack of
control by individual claimants, but just the opposite: the ability of holdout claimants to
block resolution of the entire case."). The Principles of the Law of Aggregate Litigation
proposes an alternative to the current aggregate settlement rule, which currently requires
individual informed consent by each plaintiff. See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE
LITIGATION, supra note 16, § 3.17(a)-(e). The new proposal would allow parties to agree to
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Yet even as these cases take on these essential characteristics of class
actions, they come without the "judicial quality control" required by Rule
23.40 Not only do these courts lack formal procedural devices to manage
due process issues, but they have also been prevented from using innovative
techniques, such as "virtual representation" and binding bellwether trials, to
efficiently handle complex cases and absent nonclass parties. 41 Courts can
still play a role in managing nonclass cases, but rather than scrutinizing due
process concerns, their role tends towards ensuring efficiency, for example,
by using nonbinding bellwether trials to properly price claims and
encourage settlement.42
In response to the limitations of court assurances of due process in
nonclass aggregation, academics have proposed a wide variety of means for
protecting the interests of absent or inactive parties. The proposed solutions
have included focusing on the ethics rules to ensure informed client
consent,43 encouraging increased cohesion and participation by litigation
groups,44 and properly incentivizing the attorney-client relationship to
reduce conflicts. 45 Notably, the majority of these proposed solutions have
be bound by a settlement offer, provided that, before negotiations begin, a "substantial
majority" vote to be bound by the settlement agreement. See id. § 3.17(b).
40. See Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, CAFA s Impact on Litigation as a Public Good, 29
CARDOZO L. REv. 2517, 2532 (2008) (arguing that the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005
(CAFA) will lead to fewer class certifications, leading, in part, to informal collective
proceedings that are less procedurally fair).
41. See Taylor v. Sturgell, 128 S. Ct. 2161, 2178 (2008) (rejecting virtual representation,
by which a nonparty could have been bound by a judgment, provided he shared an "identity
of interests" with the party to the judgment); see also Nagareda, supra note 34, at 42 ("The
preclusive effect envisioned would operate with respect to nonparties, such as to be
unconstitutional in the absence of agreement on the part of the individual plaintiffs
involved." (citing Taylor, 128 S. Ct. at 2172)). On binding bellwether trials, see Alexandra
D. Lahav, Bellwether Trials, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 576, 581 (2008) (noting that these
"experiments were prematurely ended, perhaps due to the influence of a Fifth Circuit
decision holding bellwether trials unconstitutional on Seventh Amendment grounds" (citing
Cimino v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 151 F.3d 297, 320-21 (5th Cir. 1998))).
42. See Lahav, supra note 41, at 581; see also MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION
(FOURTH) § 22.315 (2004) (noting that bellwether trials can "enable the parties and the court
to determine the nature and strength of the claims, whether they can be fairly developed and
litigated on a group basis and what range of values the cases may have if resolution is
attempted on a group basis"). Lahav highlights cases following the attacks of September 11,
2001, where bellwether trials on the issue of damages alone encouraged several plaintiffs to
settle. See Lahav, supra, at 580-81.
43. See Erichson, Beyond the Class Action, supra note 33, at 529 ("In non-class
litigation, we can accomplish the same objectives by looking to lawyers' professional
obligations concerning conflicts of interest and aggregate settlements. Applying the rules of
professional conduct in light of the commonalities between class actions and non-class
collective representation, lawyers can create opportunities for autonomous client decisions at
the outset and at settlement, as a substitute for client autonomy in the course of litigation and
negotiation.").
44. See Burch, supra note 26, at 46-57 (arguing that small-scale litigation group
cohesion could partially redress the lack of client contribution to aggregate litigation,
drawing on group theory and social psychology).
45. See Paul H. Edelman et al., The Allocation Problem in Multiple-Claimant
Representations, 14 SuP. CT. ECON. REv. 95, 102-11 (2006) (arguing that a properly
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been strictly private, nonjudicial approaches to the procedural problems
presented by nonclass aggregate litigation.46
This review of aggregate litigation has introduced the context in which
Congress passed CAFA. As shown above, the formal distinction between
class and nonclass aggregate litigation is not as clear as the Rules make it
seem. Both forms of litigation present significant problems of ensuring the
due process rights of absent claimants. While these problems are shared,
the means of addressing these questions differ significantly in class versus
nonclass actions. Judges are given formal responsibilities in class actions to
protect the interests of absent parties, while in nonclass aggregate litigation,
judges have a more limited role, leading to a range of proposed private
means to address these concerns. Congress was well aware of the problems
created by class actions, and of the indistinct line between these cases and
nonclass actions. CAFA's drafters, though, had a significant additional
concern-that federal courts should also protect the interests of defendants
in aggregate litigation.
B. The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005
As much as courts and commentators have been concerned with the due
process rights of claimants in aggregate litigation, Congress, by passing
CAFA, expressed its firm conviction that the opponents of class actions
deserve heightened protection. 47 CAFA was enacted in February 200548
after years of aggressive lobbying and partisan wrangling. When it finally
passed, the Senate Judiciary Committee made no secret of its motivations:
"By now, there should be little debate about the numerous problems with
our current class action system. A mounting stack of evidence reviewed by
the Committee demonstrates that abuses are undermining the rights of both
plaintiffs and defendants. '49 Class actions were deeply flawed, and the
Report of the Senate Judiciary Committee highlighted several issues that
designed contingent fee arrangement can efficiently address principal-agent problems-the
failure for advocates to maximize aggregate recovery and misallocation of recovery-in
aggregate litigation).
46. But see Alexandra D. Lahav, The Law and Large Numbers: Preserving
Adjudication in Complex Litigation, 59 FLA. L. REv. 383, 424-36 (2007) (encouraging the
development of a humanized court bureaucracy to handle mass claims and arguing that
judges are both competent to handle these claims and that the courts are needed to administer
them).
47. Congress's intent in this Note is gleaned from CAFA's legislative history, primarily
contained in the Report on the Act of the Senate Judiciary Committee. S. REP. No. 109-14
(2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3. CAFA was also the subject of debates in both the
Senate and the House of Representatives. Finally, President George W. Bush issued a
signing statement on the day CAFA was enacted. See Remarks on Signing the Class Action
Fairness Act of 2005, 1 PUB. PAPERS 270 (Feb. 18, 2005). There is a difference between
noting Congress's intent in passing CAFA and using that intent to interpret the statute. On
the latter, see infra Part I.C.2.
48. Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (codified in
scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
49. S. REP. No. 109-14, at 4, reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5.
1884 [Vol. 78
THREE PROBLEMS WITH COUNTING TO 100
disadvantaged defendants, including judicially forced settlements that
"essentially force corporate defendants to pay ransom to class attorneys by
settling-rather than litigating-frivolous lawsuits." 50  Some state court
judges, the Report also noted, deprived defendants of their due process
rights by cramming through class certifications without giving them the
"opportunity to tell [their] side of the story." 51 Despite CAFA's profession
of concern for plaintiffs taken advantage of by lawyers gaming the
procedural system,52 commentators have almost universally labeled the Act
prodefendant. 53
CAFA's design to achieve this goal was a dramatic rewriting of the
jurisdictional lines between state and federal courts. 54 Under CAFA,
Congress mandated that a large amount of class and nonclass cases-
"interstate cases of national importance"--would now fall under the
jurisdiction of the federal courts. 55 As significant as the Act's jurisdictional
policy was, Congress urged courts to expand their reach even further:
[T]he definition of "class action" is to be interpreted liberally. Its
application should not be confined solely to lawsuits that are labeled
"class actions" by the named plaintiff or the state rulemaking authority.
Generally speaking, lawsuits that resemble a purported class action should
be considered class actions for the purpose of applying these provisions. 56
CAFA's impact on the jurisdictional balance between state and federal
courts is still being assessed, 57 but Congress's overall motivation and intent
50. Id. at 20, reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 21.
51. Id. at 21-22, reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 22.
52. See, e.g., Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 § 3, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1711-1715 (2006).
This "Class Action Bill of Rights" "invites public participation in class action settlements
and regulates some settlement terms." Laurens Walker, The Consumer Class Action Bill of
Rights: A Policy and Political Mistake, 58 HASTINGs L.J. 849, 849 (2007).
53. See, e.g., Edward A. Purcell, Jr., The Class Action Fairness Act in Perspective: The
Old and the New in Federal Jurisdictional Reform, 156 U. PA. L. REv. 1823, 1867-79
(2008) (arguing that CAFA is unambiguously prodefendant); Edward F. Sherman, Consumer
Class Actions: Who Are the Real Winners?, 56 ME. L. REv. 223, 230 (2004) ("The intent of
the Act is obviously more to shield defendants than to protect class members from abuses.").
But cf Richard L. Marcus, Assessing CAFA 's Stated Jurisdictional Policy, 156 U. PA. L.
Rav. 1765, 1789 (2008) ("[O]ne could even make an argument that in the long run CAFA
will inure to the benefit of consumer plaintiffs.").
54. See, e.g., Burbank, supra note 19, at 1441 (CAFA breaks "from a nearly uniform
history of congressional contraction of diversity jurisdiction."). But see Marcus, supra note
53, at 1789 & n. 117 (citing class actions filed in California for the proposition that CAFA
has not moved these actions out of state court wholesale); cf Resnik, supra note 19, at 1938-
56 (arguing that CAFA's federalization of cases of "national importance" mirrors the
redrafting of Rule 23 in the 1960s based on a desire to expand federal jurisdiction in order to
protect plaintiffs).
55. Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, § 2(b)(2), 119 Stat. 4, 5. The
Act stated that this change would "restore the intent of the framers of the United States
Constitution." Id.
56. S. REP. No. 109-14, at 35, reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 34.
57. See Emery G. Lee III & Thomas E. Willging, The Impact of the Class Action
Fairness Act on the Federal Courts: An Empirical Analysis of Filings and Removals, 156 U.
PA. L. REv. 1723, 1750-62 (2008) (finding that the number of diversity of citizenship class
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were clear: class actions are a problem brought on by clever lawyers and
overly permissive state courts, and federal jurisdiction is at least the first
part of an answer.58
By its plain language, CAFA gives federal courts original jurisdiction
over class actions that are minimally diverse and have a total amount in
controversy greater than $5,000,000. 59 This general jurisdiction is subject
to several exceptions. The entire class must number at least 100.60 The
primary defendants cannot be "States, State officials, or other governmental
entities against whom the district court may be foreclosed from ordering
relief."'6 1  CAFA's "home state" exception requires courts to decline
jurisdiction based on a detailed calculation of the citizenship of both
plaintiffs and defendants. 62 CAFA also contains a complicated "local
controversy" exception that gives courts the right, but not the duty, to
decline jurisdiction based on the citizenship of the parties and the nature of
the action. 63 Among the factors that a court should consider are, whether
the claims are of "national or interstate interest"; choice of law issues;
whether a "nexus" exists among the plaintiffs, harm suffered, and the
defendants; and whether similar class actions have been filed within the
past three years asserting similar claims on behalf of "the same or other
persons."'64 Finally, CAFA does not apply to federal securities laws.65
The Act also altered the removal jurisdiction and procedure for class
actions. First, under CAFA, any defendant may remove, with or without
the consent of other defendants.66 Second, the Act changed the forum
defendant rule for class actions, allowing in-state defendants to remove
these cases. 67 Third, CAFA removed the one-year time limit on removal
actions filed in or removed to federal court had approximately doubled, according to the
authors' preliminary data).
58. See, e.g., Howard M. Erichson, CAFA's Impact on Class Action Lawyers, 156 U. PA.
L. REv. 1593, 1593 (2008) ("CAFA, like every other major class action development of
recent years, was born amidst snide remarks about lawyers' inventing lawsuits and
manipulating the system to enrich themselves at others' expense.").
59. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2) (2006). Minimal diversity requires only that any one
plaintiff be diverse from any one defendant-the groups as a whole need not be completely
diverse. See id. § 1332(d)(2)(A). Minimal diversity also exists if any party is a foreign state,
or a citizen or subject of a foreign state, and any opposing party is a citizen of any State. Id.
§ 1332(d)(2)(B)-(C). Plaintiffs' citizenship is determined for these purposes as of the date
of filing; however, if federal jurisdiction did not exist at filing, citizenship will be determined
as of the date of service of the papers that indicate the existence of this jurisdiction. Id.
§ 1332(d)(7).
60. Id. § 1332(d)(5)(B).
61. Id. § 1332(d)(5)(A).
62. See id. § 1332(d)(4).
63. See id. § 1332(d)(3). For a more detailed discussion of the "home state" and "local
controversy" exceptions, see Burbank, supra note 19, at 1456-57.
64. See id. § 1332(d)(3).
65. See id. § 1332(d)(9).
66. Id. § 1453(b).
67. Id.; see also id. § 1441(b) (forum defendant rule).
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for class actions.68 Fourth, the Act also provided for discretionary appeals
from orders deciding motions to remand.69
In addition to its extension of federal jurisdiction over a broader range of
class actions, CAFA formally recognized a specific set of nonclass
aggregated actions that was also subject to this broader federal scope. This
Note's next section turns to CAFA's treatment and definition of these
"'mass actions."
C. CAFA Mass Actions
1. Mass Actions: The Plain Language
In addition to redrafting the procedural rules that apply to traditional
class actions, CAFA extended federal jurisdiction over "mass actions,"
which are considered class actions for the purpose of the statute.70 CAFA
defines a mass action as "any civil action . . . in which monetary relief
claims of 100 or more persons are proposed to be tried jointly on the ground
that the plaintiffs' claims involve common questions of law or fact."' 71 To
meet this statutory definition, a mass action must also satisfy the general
threshold CAFA places on class actions. 72 Thus, the total amount in
controversy in aggregate must exceed $5,000,000, 73 and minimal diversity
must exist among the parties. 74  Confusingly, however, mass action
jurisdiction only exists over plaintiffs who satisfy the standard amount in
controversy requirement of $75,000.75 CAFA also explicitly precludes
actions brought under Rule 23 or its state analogs from being defined as
mass actions. 76
If a mass action meets these threshold requirements, jurisdiction may fail
on any of the numerous exceptions to CAFA class actions 77 or the four
specific exceptions applicable to mass actions. 78 First, a mass action cannot
be removed to federal court if all of the claims brought "arise from an event
or occurrence in the State in which the action was filed and that allegedly
68. Id. § 1453(b).
69. Id. § 1453(c).
70. See Id. § 1332(d)( 11)(A). For other detailed discussions of the mass action
provision, see Nicole Ochi, Note, Are Consumer Class and Mass Actions Dead? Complex
Litigation Strategies After CAFA & MMTJA, 41 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 965, 995-1031 (2008)
(describing the CAFA mass action and pleading strategies related to the statute's
exceptions); S. Amy Spencer, Note, Once More into the Breach, Dear Friends: The Case
for Congressional Revision of the Mass Action Provisions in the Class Action Fairness Act
of 2005, 39 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 1067, 1071-82 (2006) (outlining and examining the mass
action provision).
71. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(11)(B)(i).
72. See id. § 1332(d)(1 1)(A).
73. Id. § 1332(d)(2), (6).
74. Id. § 1332(d)(2)(A).
75. Id. § 1332(d)(1 1)(B)(i); see also id. § 1332(a).
76. See id. § 1332(d)(1 1)(B)(i); see also id. § 1711(2).
77. See id. § 1332(d)(l 1)(A); supra notes 60-65 and accompanying text.
78. See id. § 1332(d)(1 l)(B)(ii).
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resulted in injuries in that State" or contiguous States (the "event or
occurrence" exception). 79  Second, claims "joined upon motion of a
defendant" cannot be removed as mass actions. 80 Third, a mass action is
exempt if all claims "are asserted on behalf of the general public (and not
on behalf of individual claimants or members of a purported class) pursuant
to a State statute specifically authorizing such action. '81 Finally, if "the
claims have been consolidated or coordinated solely for pretrial
proceedings," a party cannot remove them as a mass action.82
The mass action provision also limits the handling of an action once it
has been successfully removed. Mass actions cannot be transferred to
another court as a part of MDL postremoval unless a majority of plaintiffs
request this transfer.83 However, the action may be transferred under the
MDL statute if the plaintiffs propose to certify the case pursuant to Rule 23
or if the case actually is certified as a class action.84
Applying the plain language of this provision and its numerosity
requirement has proved exceedingly complex. In order to understand the
arguments examined in Part II, it is first necessary to understand the
legislative history of CAFA and the mass action provision.
2. Mass Actions: The Legislative History
Just as CAFA's authors urged courts to read the statute expansively as it
applied to traditional class actions, they also stated their intent that the mass
action device be broadly construed. Indeed, the Report's authors explicitly
grounded the need for the mass action device in the similarities between
class and nonclass actions. As they succinctly put it, "mass actions are
simply class actions in disguise. ' 85 Because of this fact, the authors stated
that mass actions are "subject to many of the same abuses" that they had
excoriated in formal class actions. 86 The Report further claimed that mass
actions potentially open the door to even worse abuses, allowing lawyers to
join unrelated claims and "confuse a jury into awarding millions of dollars
to individuals who have suffered no real injury."87
The broad intent underlying the mass action device especially reveals
itself in the Report's discussion of the exceptions to mass action
jurisdiction. Simply put, the Report's authors urged courts to read these
statutory exceptions as narrowly as possible. 88 Most strikingly, the Senate
79. Id. § 1332(d)(1 1)(B)(ii)(I).
80. See id. § 1332(d)(11)(B)(ii)(II).
81. Id. § 1332(d)(l 1)(B)(ii)(III).
82. Id. § 1332(d)(1 1)(B)(ii)(IV).
83. See id. § 1332(d)(1 1)(C)(i); see also id. § 1407 (multidistrict litigation statute).
84. Id. § 1332(d)(1 1)(C)(ii).
85. S. REP. No. 109-14, at 47 (2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 44.
86. Id. at 46, reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 43; see also 151 CONG. REc. H729
(daily ed. Feb. 17, 2005) (statement of Rep. Sensenbrenner).
87. S. REP. No. 109-14, at 47, reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 44.
88. Id. ("[lit is the Committee's intent that the exceptions to this provision be interpreted
strictly by federal courts.").
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Report suggested that the "event or occurrence" exception should "apply
only to a truly local single event with no substantial interstate effects. '89
For guidance, the Report gives the example of "environmental torts such as
a chemical spill"90 that more closely resembles a "single sudden accident"
than a broader interpretation of an "occurrence." 91 The Report would also
have courts entirely preclude products liability cases from falling under this
exception. 92 By renaming the "event or occurrence" exception the "local"
occurrence exception and by introducing language that does not appear in
the statute, the Report attempted to define this exception as narrowly as
possible.93
While Congress's intent for the broad application of CAFA and the mass
action provision was clear, the statute's language is anything but. Courts
that have wrestled with applying the mass action language have had few
kind words. As the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit put it,
"CAFA's mass action provisions present an opaque, baroque maze of
89. Id. (emphasis added).
90. Id.
91. This gloss on the statute's language clashed with the views of Senator Chris Dodd,
who noted that the "event or occurrence" exception was a compromise measure that would
exempt a broader scope of cases from federal jurisdiction than those arising from a "single
sudden accident." See 151 CONG. REc. S1078 (daily ed. Feb. 8, 2005) (statement of Sen.
Dodd).
92. S. REP. No. 109-14, at 48, reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 45 ("[A] product
liability case does not qualify for the 'local' occurrence exception in the provision."); see
also 151 CONG. REc. H732 (daily ed. Feb. 17, 2005) (statement of Rep. Sensenbrenner)
("[T]his exception would not apply to a product liability or insurance case."). The Senate
Judiciary Committee vigorously debated whether the mass action provision would extend
federal jurisdiction over mass tort cases. Compare 151 CONG. REc. S 1099-1100 (daily ed.
Feb 8, 2005) (statement of Sen. Durbin) ("These personal injury claims are usually based on
State laws .... I am afraid if [CAFA] becomes law, the so-called mass action provision will
preempt all of these State procedures and take them out of State courts."), with 151 CONG.
REc. S1082 (daily ed. Feb. 8, 2005) (statement of Sen. Lott) ("Mass torts and mass actions
are not the same. The phrase 'mass torts' refers to a situation in which many persons are
injured by the same underlying cause, such as a single explosion, a series of events, or
exposure to a particular product. In contrast, the phrase 'mass action' refers to a specific
type of lawsuit in which a large number of plaintiffs seek to have all their claims adjudicated
in one combined trial."). In order to draw focus away from the statute's potential impact on
mass torts, Senator Lott emphasized its application in states such as Mississippi that do not
have analogs to Rule 23. See 151 CONG. REC. S1082 (daily ed. Feb. 8, 2005) (statement of
Sen. Lott). Senator Durbin seized on this example to argue that the mass action was
intended to apply solely to states that lack a class action device. See 151 CONG. REc. S1236
(daily ed. Feb. 10, 2005) (statement of Sen. Durbin) ("And I understand from the statements
made by Senator LOTT . . . that these so-called mass actions are currently filed only in
Mississippi and West Virginia. In other words, this provision of [CAFA] will have no
impact on mass torts cases filed in the other 48 States.").
93. Compare S. REP. No. 109-14, at 47, reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 44 ("The first
exception would apply only to a truly local single event with no substantial interstate
effects." (emphasis added)), with 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(l1)(B)(ii)(I) (2006) ("[A]ll of the
claims in the action arise from an event or occurrence in the State in which the action was




interlocking cross-references that defy easy interpretation .... "94 Indeed,
before courts had begun to examine this provision, commentators had
already predicted that the mass action would be difficult to apply. 95 Even
the number 100 is far less clear in application than the round figure would
imply. The remainder of this part introduces the statutory ambiguities
related to the mass action numerosity provision that have given rise to the
litigation discussed in Part II.
Before analyzing the statute's ambiguities, though, it is necessary to say a
few words on how CAFA's legislative history might be used to aid in
statutory interpretation. As a general rule, a court's analysis of a statute
begins, and ideally ends, with its plain language. 96 Yet when confronted
with an ambiguous statute, courts may choose to draw from the legislative
history to aid their interpretation.97 It should be noted, however, that the
very use of these materials as a tool in statutory interpretation is a hotly
debated subject. 98 Among these extrinsic aides to interpretation, committee
reports "represent the most persuasive indicia of congressional intent in
enacting a statute." 99  Statements of legislators during debate are less
94. Lowery v. Ala. Power Co., 483 F.3d 1184, 1198 (1lth Cir. 2007) (citing Abrego
Abrego v. Dow Chem. Co., 443 F.3d 676 (9th Cir. 2006)). The Abrego Abrego v. Dow
Chemical Co. court declared CAFA's language "clumsy" and "far from straightforward."
Abrego Abrego, 443 F.3d at 680-82; see also Lowery v. Honeywell Int'l, Inc., 460 F. Supp.
2d 1288, 1293 (N.D. Ala. 2006) (calling the mass action provision a "Gordian knot").
95. See GEORGENE M. VAIRO, CLASS ACTION FAIRNESS ACT OF 2005: WITH
COMMENTARY AND ANALYSIS BY GEORGENE M. VAIRO OF THE MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE
BOARD OF EDITORS 37-38 (2005) ("[W]ith respect to mass actions, Congress has achieved
nothing in terms of efficiency. Further, given the complexity of [the mass action provision],
it will be interesting to note how fast and adept plaintiffs' lawyers will become in pleading
around these various provisions .... ); Spencer, supra note 70, at 1083-96.
96. See, e.g., Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Union Planters Bank, N.A., 530 U.S. 1, 6
(2000) ("[W]hen 'the statute's language is plain, "the sole function of the courts"'-at least
where the disposition required by the text is not absurd-"'is to enforce it according to its
terms."' (quoting United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 241 (1989))).
97. See, e.g., United States v. Thompson/Center Arms Co., 504 U.S. 505, 515-16 & n.8(1992) (plurality opinion) (relying on the history of congressional amendments to analyze
ambiguous language). But see, e.g., James J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear, The Decline and
Fall of Legislative History? Patterns of Supreme Court Reliance in the Burger and
Rehnquist Eras, 89 JUDICATURE 220, 222 (2006) (concluding that U.S. Supreme Court
reliance on legislative history in cases on workplace law had declined dramatically from the
Burger Court to the Rehnquist Court).
98. See Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Federal Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 115
HARV. L. REV. 2085, 2150-51 (2002) (discussing the debate between strict textualists who
reject the use of legislative history and others who consider it an invaluable tool). But cf
Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 568 (2005) ("[T]he authoritative
statement is the statutory text, not the legislative history or any other extrinsic material.
Extrinsic materials have a role in statutory interpretation only to the extent they shed a
reliable light on the enacting Legislature's understanding of otherwise ambiguous terms.").
99. 2A NORMAN J. SINGER & J. D. SHAMBLE SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION § 48:6, at 570-72 (7th ed. 2007). But see Wis. Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier,
501 U.S. 597, 617 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring) ("[The] only mistake [is] failing to
recognize how unreliable Committee Reports are-not only as a genuine indicator of
congressional intent but as a safe predictor of judicial construction. We use them when it is
convenient, and ignore them when it is not.").
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reliable indicia of congressional intent, though ones that courts have
sometimes used.100 The postenactment views of legislators, by contrast, are
of limited, or even no, use to statutory interpretation.' 01
This final point is of especial importance for CAFA. Courts have split in
their reliance on CAFA's legislative history, 10 2 primarily contained in a
Report of the Senate Judiciary Committee, 10 3 as well as in debate in the
Senate, and a short debate in the House of Representatives.'1 4 Most courts
have limited their focus to the Senate Report, but many give the Report
little weight or disregard it entirely. 10 5  The courts that take the latter
approach have often based their choice on the assertion that the Report was
not presented to the Senate until after CAFA's passage and enactment. 10 6
The true history of the Report, though, is just as opaque as CAFA's
language. The Report is dated February 28, 2005-ten days after CAFA's
enactment.10 7 However, it seems that the Report was formally submitted to
the Senate on February 3--during its consideration of the Act. 10 8 Those
100. Compare Grove City Coll. v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555, 565-71 (1984), superseded by
statute, Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-259, 102 Stat. 28 (using
congressional debate and postenactment legislative history as persuasive indicia of
congressional intent), with Bath Iron Works Corp. v. Dir., Office of Workers' Comp.
Programs, 506 U.S. 153, 166 (1993) ("[W]hen carefully read, we find the text of the statute
unambiguous on the point at issue; accordingly, we give no weight to a single reference by a
single Senator during floor debate in the Senate.").
101. See 2A SINGER & SHAMBIE SINGER, supra note 99, § 48:20, at 628 ("Post-enactment
views of those involved with the legislation should not be considered when interpreting the
statute.").
102. Compare Lowery v. Ala. Power Co., 483 F.3d 1184, 1205-06 (11th Cir. 2007)
(using the Senate Report to buttress its conclusions regarding CAFA's individual amount in
controversy requirement), with Blockbuster, Inc. v. Galeno, 472 F.3d 53, 58 (2d Cir. 2006)
(rejecting reliance on the Senate Report, in large part because the court believed it was only
considered after CAFA's passage).
103. S. REP. No. 109-14 (2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3.
104. 151 CONG. REc. H723 (daily ed. Feb. 17, 2005). The House debated and voted on
CAFA in less than four hours. Compare id. at H727 (debate starting at approximately 10:30
a.m.), with id. at H756 (vote on CAFA concluding shortly before 2 p.m.). President Bush
also issued a signing statement on CAFA. Remarks on Signing the Class Action Fairness Act
of 2005, 1 PUB. PAPERS 270 (Feb. 18, 2005); see also supra note 47.
105. See, e.g., Tanoh v. Dow Chem. Co., 561 F.3d 945, 954 n.5 (9th Cir.) ("Dow relies
heavily on a Senate Committee report that was not printed until ten days after CAFA's
passage into law. . . .The Report is therefore of minimal, if any, value in discerning
congressional intent, as it was not before the Senate at the time of CAFA's enactment."
(citations omitted)), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 187 (2009).
106. See, e.g., Blockbuster, 472 F.3d at 58.
107. Compare S. REP. No. 109-14, reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3 (dated February 28,
2005), with Remarks on Signing the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, 1 PUB. PAPERS 270
(Feb. 18, 2005).
108. See 151 CONG. REc. S978 (daily ed. Feb. 3, 2005) (noting that a committee report
was introduced regarding "a bill to amend the procedures that apply to consideration of
interstate class actions to assure fairer outcomes for class members and defendants, and for
other purposes"); see also Lowery v. Ala. Power Co., 483 F.3d 1184, 1206 n.50 (11 th Cir.
2007). CAFA passed the Senate on February 10, 2005, passed the House on February 17,
and was signed by the President the following day. See Class Action Fairness Act of 2005,
Pub. L. No. 109-2, § 9, 119 Stat. 4, 14 & note (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1332 note).
2010] 1891
FORDHAM LA W REVIEW
that have noticed this fact have insisted that the Senate Report should be
given the full weight owed to formal legislative history. 109 But in his
additional views contained in the Report, Senator Patrick Leahy decried that
"[t]he circulation and filing of this report occurred after passage of the
legislation for Senate consideration of the underlying bill. Indeed, it was
filed after the House of Representatives passed this legislation."" 0 Because
of this failure, the Senator contended that the Report did not assist the
Senate in its consideration of the bill."' To further cloud the picture, the
House debate following the Senate's passage of CAFA includes many
passages taken verbatim from the Senate Report. 112 But these passages
were added to the record following debate and could have been added after
February 23.'13 Given the disparity between Senator Leahy's comments
and the fact that a report was submitted to the Senate on February 3, there is
no clear answer to the question of the Report's timing.
3. Mass Actions: The Statutory Ambiguities
Although the legislative history's own tangled backstory is intriguing, it
would be of no more than academic interest if the statute were subject to an
unambiguous reading. However, despite the clear number 100, the mass
action's numerosity requirement has revealed deep statutory ambiguities
that have sent courts and litigators to the legislative history for guidance.
CAFA's supporters intended for the statute to be read broadly, but this
general intent does not resolve specific issues raised by the application of
the mass action's numerosity requirement. Indeed, the disparity between
Congress's intent and CAFA's language has opened the door to competing
interpretations of the number 100 that this Note will discuss in Part II. The
arguments advanced in those cases also draw on the recognition of the
similarities between class and nonclass actions that both CAFA and its
109. See H. Hunter Twiford, III, et al., CAFA's New "Minimal Diversity" Standard for
Interstate Class Actions Creates a Presumption That Jurisdiction Exists, with the Burden of
Proof Assigned to the Party Opposing Jurisdiction, 25 Miss. C. L. REv. 7, 52-67 (2005)
(arguing, as the title hints, that CAFA creates a presumption in favor of finding diversityjurisdiction and places the burden of proof on the party opposing jurisdiction, in part because
of clearly stated congressional intent).
110. S. REP. No. 109-14, at 79, reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 73 (additional views of
Sen. Patrick Leahy).
111. See id. ("Committee reports, like Committee consideration of measures, are intended
to assist the Senate in its consideration of the matter .... In this case, that did not occur.").
112. Compare, e.g., 151 CONG. REC. H729 (daily ed. Feb. 17, 2005) (statement of Rep.
Sensenbrenner) ("The first exception would apply only to a truly local single event with no
substantial interstate effects."), with S. REP. No. 109-14, at 47, reprinted in 2005
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 44 (identical language).
113. See 151 CONG. REc. H726 (daily ed. Feb. 17, 2005) (statement of Rep.
Sensenbrenner) ("[A]II Members may have 5 legislative days within which to revise and
extend their remarks and include extraneous material on S. 5."); see also id. at H727
(statement of Rep. Sensenbrenner) ("We do not have the time in general debate for me to
give this statement on the floor, so I will insert the statement relative to the intent of the
managers of the bill in the REcorD at this point.").
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legislative history share. The remainder of this section highlights three
phrases in the statute that, despite their deceptive simplicity, have
ambiguous meanings: "claims of . . .persons," "proposed to be tried
jointly," and the number 100 itself.
First, "claims of ... persons" has proved deceptively difficult to define
concretely. The statute does make clear that the claims must be for
monetary relief, excluding purely injunctive suits. 114 However, the statute
is silent on the treatment of cases that involve claims for both types of
relief, leaving courts to decide for themselves how to proceed.11 5 The more
serious debates have centered on the identity of the owners of these
claims-"persons." 1 6 The statute does not define "persons," and in the
Senate Report and debates in both houses, legislators spoke exclusively of
"plaintiffs.""11 7  Further, in this same subsection, the statute refers to
"plaintiffs whose claims in a mass action satisfy the jurisdictional"' 18
amount in controversy requirement, creating more confusion over that
term's absence from the earlier definition. In the context of aggregate
litigation, it is difficult to develop a vocabulary that properly includes all of
the types of parties and persons who have an interest in the proceedings. 119
CAFA's term exacerbates that difficulty. By using the amorphous "person"
rather than a more precise word, CAFA opens at least the possibility that
nonparties or nonclaimants could be counted towards the 100-person
threshold. 120
The statute's requirement that the claims of persons are "proposed to be
tried jointly"'121 is equally ambiguous. As to who must propose that the
claims be tried jointly, the Senate Report specifies that it is the "plaintiffs
who claim that their suits ... should be tried together even though they do
114. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(1l)(B)(i) (2006); see also Kitazato v. Black Diamond
Hospitality Invs., LLC, No. 09-00271 DAE-LEK, 2009 WL 3824851, at *5 (D. Haw. Nov.
13, 2009) ("CAFA's plain language mandated that Plaintiffs' claims be for monetary
relief.").
115. See Louisiana ex rel. Caldwell v. Allstate Ins. Co., 536 F.3d 418, 430 (5th Cir. 2008)
(allowing for injunctive and monetary claims to be treated separately).
116. See infra notes 281-92 and accompanying text.
117. See, e.g., 151 CONG. REC. H732 (daily ed. Feb. 17, 2005) (statement of Rep.
Sensenbrenner) ("The Federal Court would have jurisdiction over the mass action because
there are more than 100 plaintiffs ...."); 151 CONG. REC. S1082 (daily ed. Feb. 8, 2005)
(statement of Sen. Lott) ("The mass action section was specifically included to prevent
plaintiffs' lawyers from making this end run."); id. at S1097 (statement of Sen. Feingold)
("[The Act] simply requires that the plaintiffs be seeking damages of more than $75,000 for
the case to be considered a mass action .....
118. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(1 1)(B)(i).
119. See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION § 1.01 cmt. c (Proposed
Final Draft 2009) (discussing confusion that can arise from improperly labeling nonparties in
aggregate proceedings).
120. See infra Part II.C; see also Caldwell, 536 F.3d at 424 & n.4 (discussing the Senate's
rejection of an amendment that would have exempted class actions filed by states' attorneys
general).
121. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(l1)(B)(i).
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not seek class certification status." 122 The statute's plain language excludes
the defendants from making the proposal. 123 However, as the Senate debate
revealed, it seems possible that a court could itself propose to try discrete
claims jointly and create a CAFA mass action. 124 "Tried jointly" is also not
an easily defined term. In the House debate, Representative Jim
Sensenbrenner stated that this component would be satisfied by naming 100
or more plaintiffs in a complaint, "because there would be no other apparent
reason to include all of those claimants in a single action unless the intent
was to secure a joint trial of the claims asserted in the action." 125 While it
seems that mass formal joinder is sufficient to show an intent to be tried
jointly, it is not clear that it is necessary. 126 Given the multiple ways of
adjudicating and disposing of aggregate litigation, the claims of 100 or
more persons can come into court without mass joinder. 127 Although the
Senate Report explicitly encourages courts to look past the labels used by
parties, it is unclear how the mass action device should tally claims not
formally aggregated through the Federal Rules.
Even the number 100 is less concrete than it appears. The statute states
that its "jurisdiction shall exist only over those plaintiffs whose claims in a
mass action satisfy" the $75,000 jurisdictional minimum. 128 Because the
mass action threshold is only $5,000,000, there is a tension between these
two requirements: if all 100 persons in a mass action were required to meet
the individual threshold, the mass action would have a de facto amount in
controversy requirement of $7,500,000.129 The statute specifies that the
court does not have jurisdiction over individual plaintiffs who fail to satisfy
the jurisdictional minimum, but it is silent over how the result of this
separating sheep from goats should affect the court's treatment of the mass
122. S. REP. No. 109-14, at 46 (2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 43.
123. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(1 1)(B)(ii)(II).
124. This inference can be made based on the rejection of an amendment by Senator
Durbin that would have exempted claims joined "by the court sua sponte" from mass action
jurisdiction. See 151 CONG. REC. S1 101 (daily ed. Feb. 8, 2005) (Amendment No. 3). The
amendment also proposed to strike the word "solely" from the pretrial proceedings
exemption, potentially eliminating mass action jurisdiction from all consolidated claims. See
151 CONG. REc. Si 100-01 (daily ed. Feb. 8, 2005) (statement of Sen. Durbin). Two days
after its introduction, Senator Durbin withdrew his proposed amendment. See 151 CONG.
REc. S1236 (daily ed. Feb. 10, 2005) (statement of Sen. Durbin). Senator Durbin, in
expressing his concern about the potential for courts to create mass actions sua sponte,
particularly referenced state court proceedings against the Vioxx manufacturer Merck. See
151 CONG. REc. S1099-1100 (daily ed. Feb. 8, 2005) (statement of Sen. Durbin); see also
Alexandra D. Lahav, Recovering the Social Value of Jurisdictional Redundancy, 82 TUL. L.
REV. 2369, 2394 & nn. 106-07 (2008) (describing Vioxx trials and settlement).
125. 151 CONG. REc. H729 (daily ed. Feb. 17, 2005) (statement of Rep. Sensenbrenner).
126. But cf Spencer, supra note 70, at 1080 ("[T]he most logical reading of 'proposed to
be tried jointly,' leads to the conclusion that Congress meant only for claims joined willfully
by the plaintiff under Rule 20(a) or a state equivalent to be treated as a class action subject to
§ 1332(d)(2)-(10)." (citations omitted)).
127. For example, the claims of 100 or more persons can come into court through
intervention. See FED. R. Civ. P. 24.
128. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)( 11)(B)(i).
129. See id. § 1332(d)(2).
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in its entirety. 130 In these circumstances, the Senate Report urged that
courts maintain jurisdiction over the mass, but remand individual plaintiffs
who do not meet the $75,000 threshold-even if the result is a mass action
with fewer than 100 members. 131 So long as the mass action as originally
constituted met the jurisdiction requirements, "subsequent remands should
not extinguish federal diversity jurisdiction[]over the action."' 132 In the
House debate, Representative Sensenbrenner added that a court could
maintain supplemental jurisdiction over the smaller claims. 133
This section has introduced ambiguities in the mass action statute that
make the clarity of the number 100 illusory in practice. Interpreting these
ambiguities depends on an understanding of both the fundamental
similarities between class and nonclass aggregate litigation, as well as
Congress's broad intent in drafting CAFA and the mass action provision.
Part II turns to three lines of cases that have drawn on these sources in order
to apply the mass action numerosity requirement.
II. THREE WAYS To COUNT TO 100: NUMEROSITY WITH MORE THAN 100
PARTIES, FEWER THAN 100 PARTIES, AND WITH A SINGLE PARTY
This part examines three types of mass action numerosity questions that
courts have addressed. All of these cases display a tension in the courts'
analyses among a plain reading of the statute's ambiguous language,
consideration of CAFA's broad legislative intent, and the similarities
between class and nonclass aggregate litigation. The first line of cases
presents a clear application of the statute-actions with more than 100
formally joined plaintiffs. Yet the plaintiffs in these cases have argued that
the statute should not apply because their claims are not "proposed to be
tried jointly." Courts in these cases have unanimously found federal
jurisdiction. In the second line of cases, more than 100 plaintiffs have split
their claims into parallel actions, each with fewer than 100 formal parties.
Defendants in these cases have argued that despite this structuring, courts
should consider these separate actions as a single mass action-effectively,
that plaintiffs in separate actions propose to try their claims jointly. All
courts presented with these arguments have refused to aggregate separate
actions into one mass action. In the third line of cases, defendants have
argued that "claims of ... persons" should include more than formal parties
and extend to the "real parties in interest" to an action. Courts have split in
130. This silence may be due to the fact that this provision was the result of a legislative
compromise. See 151 CONG. REC. S1078 (daily ed. Feb. 8, 2005) (statement of Sen. Dodd).
131. See S. REP. No. 109-14, at 47 (2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 44; 151
CONG. REC. H729 (daily ed. Feb. 17, 2005) (statement of Rep. Sensenbrenner).
132. S. REP. No. 109-14, at 47, reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 44.
133. See 151 CONG. REc. H732 (daily ed. Feb. 17, 2005) (statement of Rep.
Sensenbrenner) ("[The mass action] provision in no way is intended to abrogate [28 U.S.C. §
1367] to narrow current jurisdictional rules. Thus, if a Federal court believed it to be
appropriate, the court could apply supplemental jurisdiction in the mass action context as
well.").
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their reception to this argument. In sum, litigants have made the apparently
simple task of applying the mass action's numerosity requirement decidedly
difficult in practice.
A. Mass Actions with More than 100 Parties
A case for monetary relief with more than 100 joined plaintiffs would
seem to easily qualify as a CAFA mass action. Yet even under these
circumstances, the ambiguous statutory language has given attorneys-both
plaintiffs' and defendants'-the opportunity to litigate the precise meaning
of "proposed to be tried jointly."'134 Courts have universally found that
joining more than 100 plaintiffs in a single complaint satisfies this
intentionality requirement.
1. Bullard v. Burlington Northern Santa Fe Railway Co.
In 2007, Virda Bell Bullard, formally joined with 143 other plaintiffs,
filed a tort claim in Illinois state court, seeking money damages arising
from injuries caused by a wood treatment facility in Somerville, Texas. 135
Many of the plaintiffs, including Bullard herself, were simultaneously
involved in parallel suits in Texas and other venues. 136  Defendants
removed to federal court, asserting CAFA mass action jurisdiction, which
prompted two motions from the plaintiffs-one to remand the case to state
court and another asking for voluntary dismissal of fifty-three plaintiffs
without prejudice. 137 The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois denied plaintiffs' motion to remand and rejected their contention
that they had not proposed to try their claims jointly but had merely
consolidated them for pretrial purposes. 138 By filing a single complaint for
all 144 plaintiffs, the court held that the plaintiffs had opened the possibility
of CAFA mass action removal.139
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district
court's reading of CAFA-the only sensible one according to the circuit
court. 140 The Seventh Circuit agreed with the lower court's ruling that "one
complaint implicitly proposes one trial" even if plaintiffs would be happy to
resolve the case without coming before a jury. 141 However, the Seventh
134. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(l1)(B)(i).
135. See Bullard v. Burlington N. Santa Fe Ry. Co., No. 07 C 6883, 2008 WL 4104355,
at *1 (N.D. I11. Aug. 29, 2008).
136. See id. at *6, *9. Most of the plaintiffs apart from Virda Bell Bullard identified
themselves as Texas citizens. See id. at *2.
137. See Bullard v. Burlington N. Santa Fe Ry. Co., 556 F. Supp. 2d 858, 859 (N.D. I11.
2008). The court reserved judgment on the motion to voluntarily dismiss. See id. at 860; see
also infra notes 146-47.
138. See Bullard, 556 F. Supp. 2d at 859-60.
139. Seeid. at 860.
140. See Bullard v. Burlington N. Santa Fe Ry. Co., 535 F.3d 759, 761 (7th Cir. 2008).
141. Id. at 762. Although not referenced by the court, this conclusion echoes that of
CAFA's supporters in the House of Representatives. See supra note 125.
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Circuit extended its reasoning in a lengthy dictum on how a court would
actually try 100 or more plaintiffs. Chief Judge Frank H. Easterbrook
began by noting the similarities between mass and class actions as they are
handled by courts and litigators.' 42  The Bullard complaint lacked
specificity as to individual plaintiffs, just as in class action pleadings. 143
The court presumed that in Bullard, like in a class action, only a few
plaintiffs would be active, leaving the lawyers to run the case. 144 Having
established the lack of real distinction between Bullard and a class action
making similar allegations, the Chief Judge made a far broader suggestion:
The question is not whether 100 or more plaintiffs answer a roll call in
court, but whether the "claims" advanced by 100 or more persons are
proposed to be tried jointly. A trial of 10 exemplary plaintiffs, followed
by application of issue or claim preclusion to 134 more plaintiffs without
another trial, is one in which the claims of 100 or more persons are being
tried jointly, and [CAFA] thus brings the suit within federal
jurisdiction. 145
This dictum advances the reasoning based on similarities between class and
nonclass actions far beyond the facts of Bullard. Taken on its face, the
Chief Judge's analysis suggests that mass actions could encompass even
informally aggregated actions that utilized some form of bellwether trial.
After the Seventh Circuit's ruling, the district court presiding over the
case further concluded that the plaintiffs' single complaint locked them into
CAFA's jurisdiction, even if they subsequently voluntarily dismissed
enough plaintiffs for the action to fall below the numerosity threshold.' 46
The district court considered the question of federal jurisdiction settled and,
further, would allow voluntary dismissal only on the condition that they not
later file similar claims in a manner designed to avoid CAFA
jurisdiction.' 47
Based on the Seventh Circuit's reasoning and the uncited legislative
history, Bullard is an easy case. But the court's reasoning-in its broad
dictum and its analogizing mass actions to class actions-hints at how
courts could expand the reach of the mass action provision.
2. Cooper v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.
Cooper v. R.J Reynolds Tobacco Co.148 is a mirror image of
Bullard. But just as plaintiffs in Bullard could not evade CAFA by
142. See Bullard, 535 F.3d at 761.
143. See id. ("[Plaintiffs'] complaint alleges that several questions of law and fact are
common to all 144 plaintiffs; it provides no more information about each individual plaintiff
than an avowed class complaint would do.").
144. Id. ("[A]s a practical matter counsel will dominate, just as in a class action.").
145. Id. at 762.
146. See Bullard v. Burlington N. Santa Fe Ry. Co., No. 07 C 6883, 2008 WL 4104355,
at *7-10 (N.D. Il. Aug. 29, 2008).
147. See id. at *8, *10.
148. 586 F. Supp. 2d 1312 (M.D. Fla. 2008).
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shedding plaintiffs postremoval, the Cooper court held that a defendant
does not squander federal jurisdiction by artful trial strategy. Cooper
involved the claims of approximately 3400 individuals who had previously
been parties to a 700,000-member class action before it was decertified by
the Florida Supreme Court. 149  Rather than bringing their claims
individually, the Cooper plaintiffs filed mass actions, each involving
approximately 200 parties.' 50 The U.S. District Court for the Middle
District of Florida found that none of the mass action exceptions applied to
these actions but that a numerosity question remained.151
The defendant cigarette companies announced that, although they had
removed the case as a single CAFA mass action, they intended to argue that
each plaintiff's claim should be severed and tried individually. 152 If they
succeeded, the trial court would be left with a CAFA mass action involving
the claims of more than 100 plaintiffs but proceeding to more than 100
unique trials. 153 Despite this potentially bizarre result, the court held that
removal was proper.' 54
Beginning with the statutory text, the court essentially concluded that
defendants' postremoval intent was irrelevant, given that the plaintiffs
originally proposed to try their claims jointly. 155 Were it to evaluate subject
matter jurisdiction continually, as the plaintiffs requested, later severance
would fail to give effect to the statute's intent-related language. 156
Underlying this conclusion was the court's holding that CAFA did not
change the "'general rule that postremoval events do not deprive federal
courts of subject-matter jurisdiction.'" 57 The court analogized this strategy
to the potential postremoval remand of parties who collectively constitute a
mass action but do not meet the individual amount in controversy
requirement of more than $75,000.158 Under these circumstances, the court
149. See id. at 1314 (citing Engle v. Liggett Group, Inc., 945 So. 2d 1246 (Fla. 2006)).
150. See id.
151. See id. at 1315-18. This result would also turn the "pretrial proceedings" exception
to mass action jurisdiction on its head. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(1 1)(B)(ii) (2006).
152. Cooper, 586 F. Supp. 2d at 1318.
153. See id. at 1320; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(1 1)(B)(ii)(IV).
154. See Cooper, 586 F. Supp. 2d at 1322-23.
155. See id. at 1319-20.
156. See id. at 1320.
157. Id. at 1319 (quoting Powerex Corp. v. Reliant Energy Servs., Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2411,
2417 n. 1 (2007)). The court also cited several cases in which federal courts retained CAFA
jurisdiction over cases after class certification had been denied. See id.
158. See id. at 1320. In two important CAFA cases, the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the
Ninth and Eleventh Circuits both addressed this question, raised by the dual amount in
controversy requirements for individual and mass action jurisdiction. See Lowery v. Ala.
Power Co., 483 F.3d 1184 (11 th Cir. 2007); Abrego Abrego v. Dow Chem. Co., 443 F.3d
676 (9th Cir. 2006). The Ninth Circuit noted the possibility that the remand of individual
plaintiffs who do not meet the $75,000 jurisdictional minimum could result in a mass action
with fewer than 100 parties; however, the court avoided resolving this issue, finding that the
defendants had not shown that any of the plaintiffs satisfied this requirement. See id. at 686-
90. The Lowery v. Alabama Power Co. court concluded that the statute's plain language, as
well as congressional intent, dictated that a court retain federal jurisdiction in such a case,
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concluded, it would retain jurisdiction of the case, even if the number of
plaintiffs remaining in federal court was less than 100.159
The court also consulted CAFA's "relatively thin" legislative history for
guidance. 160 Although the final statutory language is the neutral "proposed
to be tried jointly,"'161 the court seized on two passages from the Senate
Report that suggested Congress meant for the plaintiffs' intent to be
dispositive. 162 The Report defines mass actions as suits brought by at least
100 "plaintiffs who claim that their suits.., should be tried together"'163 or
as "any civil action in which 100 or more named parties seek to try their
claims for monetary relief together." 164 The Report's language-"plaintiffs
who claim," "parties [who] seek"-seemed to the court to envisage an
inquiry into the plaintiffs' intent, rather than a detached, objective
assessment of whether 100 or more parties will be tried jointly.
The court concluded its analysis by drawing on the broader purpose
giving rise to CAFA. 165 The Senate Report had stated that "'mass actions
are simply class actions in disguise.""' 166 Cooper presented a clearer
example than some-all the plaintiffs had previously been members of the
putative class in a large, decertified class action. 167 The court found that
the plaintiffs' trial strategy-bringing claims in groups of 200 rather than
individually-created the class action in disguise warned of in the Senate
Report. 168 Under other circumstances, the defendants' remove-and-sever
strategy "although procedurally defensible, could be viewed as a misuse of
CAFA jurisdiction."' 169 However, in light of the choice to bring their claims
in groups of 200 rather than individually, "plaintiffs' litigation strategy has
invited defendants' CAFA removal. That defendants removed to this Court
with the strategic intent to seek severance of plaintiffs' claims has no effect
on this Court's subject matter jurisdiction."'170
But even the Cooper court was not overjoyed with its result. In its
opinion, these cases would do nothing but add a tremendous burden to the
but also mooted this conclusion because the defendant did not show that the $5,000,000
amount in controversy requirement was satisfied. See Lowery, 483 F.3d at 1205-07, 1218-
21. For a detailed summary of this lengthy case, see Georgene M. Vairo, CAFA Mass Action
Primer, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 10, 2007, at 13.
159. See Cooper, 586 F. Supp. 2d at 1315 n.1 (citing Lowery, 483 F.3d at 1204-07). But
see Lowery, 483 F.3d at 1207 ("We need only decide what the $75,000 provision does not
do-namely, supplant the Act's plainly expressed $5,000,000 aggregate requirement by
requiring a per-plaintiff minimum threshold requirement that ultimately requires a showing
of claims worth $7,500,000 in the aggregate.").
160. Cooper, 586 F. Supp. 2d at 1321.
161. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(1 l)(B)(i) (2006).
162. See Cooper, 586 F. Supp. 2d at 1321.
163. S. REP. No. 109-14, at 46 (2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 43.
164. Id., reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 44.
165. See Cooper, 586 F. Supp. 2d at 1322.







dockets of federal courts and, argued normatively, properly belonged in
Florida state courts. Although the court professed that CAFA had
ineluctably compelled its result, it made clear that this conclusion "should
not imply that the Court believes it should have jurisdiction" over these
cases. 
171
The courts in Bullard and Cooper each believed their cases to be
relatively simple. Yet they also reveal the ambiguities brought out by even
the most straightforward application of the CAFA mass action numerosity
requirement. The courts' reasoning also demonstrates the permeability of
any distinction between class and nonclass litigation-a fact that the courts
leverage in their decisions. In Bullard and Cooper, there is little tension
between a strict reading of the statute's numerosity requirement and the
realities of aggregate litigation. The following sections, however, will
examine cases where a strict reading of the numerosity requirement does
not easily mesh with the nature of nonclass aggregation.
B. Mass Actions with Fewer than 100 Parties
CAFA enunciated a hard numerosity threshold in its mass action
definition. This bright line, however, practically begs a creative lawyer to
structure complaints in order to evade CAFA's scope by including fewer
than 100 plaintiffs in any one suit. Indeed, barely a year after CAFA's
passage, some plaintiffs' lawyers had predicted that this tactic would
essentially neuter the mass action device. 172 The Ninth Circuit grappled
with precisely this structuring in Tanoh. The Ninth Circuit took a strict
textual approach to this question, ignoring the defendants' invitation to look
past the plaintiffs' artful pleading, and rejected the existence of a mass
action.
1. Tanoh v. Dow Chemical Co.
In Tanoh v. Dow Chemical Co., 17 3 664 West African fruit plantation
workers filed state law tort claims against Dow and other companies for
injuries allegedly caused by pesticide use. 174 Rather than bringing these
171. Id.
172. See David A. P. Brower, The 2003 Amendments to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure and the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, in 2 CIVIL PRACTICE AND
LITIGATION TECHNIQUES IN FEDERAL AND STATE COURTS 1467, 1488 n.20 (ALI-ABA Course
of Study Materials No. SL081, May 31-June 1, 2006) ("Since plaintiffs can avoid this
provision simply by joining only 99 plaintiffs, it is unlikely to have great impact in
practice.").
173. 561 F.3d 945 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 187 (2009).
174. Id. at 950-51. The pesticide 1,2-dibromo-3-chloropropane (DBCP) was used to
control nematodes that infest plant roots. Id. at 951 n.1. In 1979, the EPA banned domestic
use of DBCP, but permitted its continuing export. Id. The plaintiffs alleged that Dow
continued to supply DBCP to plantations in the Ivory Coast until 1986. Id. The continued
use of DBCP abroad has spawned a host of lawsuits filed in Florida, Louisiana, Hawaii, and
California, and one jury verdict for $3.3 million. Robert C. Cook, Pesticides: U.S. Supreme
Court Declines To Scrutinize Lawsuits Filed by West African Fruit Workers, Chem. Reg.
1900 [Vol. 78
THREE PROBLEMS WITH COUNTING TO 100
claims in a single action, the plaintiffs filed seven separate suits in
California state court--each containing fewer than 100 plaintiffs.1 75
Simultaneously, these workers filed a parallel action in federal court
asserting claims under the Alien Tort Statute.1 76 In all of these actions, the
plaintiffs were represented by the same counsel.177 On November 10, 2009,
subsequent to the cases discussed in this section, the Superior Court in Los
Angeles County, California, dismissed Tanoh amidst allegations of ethical
improprieties by the plaintiffs' lawyers. 178
After the filing of the multiple actions in state court, the defendants
removed Tanoh, arguing both that the plaintiffs had fraudulently joined
nondiverse defendants and that the actions considered as a whole
constituted a CAFA mass action. The U.S. District Court for the Central
District of California rejected these arguments and ordered remand. 179 The
court first ruled that the forum defendants had been properly joined, citing
the heavy burden facing defendants arguing fraudulent joinder and the
courts' general presumption against finding removal jurisdiction.180
The court briefly addressed the defendants' CAFA argument. The
defendants argued that the plaintiffs had strategically structured their state
Daily (BNA) DIO (Oct. 6, 2009), available at 10/6/2009 CHRD dl0 (Westlaw). The
plaintiffs' exposure to DBCP allegedly caused sterility and infertility. Tanoh, 561 F.3d at
950-51.
175. Tanoh, 561 F.3dat 951.
176. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006); see Abagninin v. Amvac Chem. Corp., 545 F.3d 733, 735
& n.2 (9th Cir. 2008). The district court hearing these claims accepted the transfer of the
removed state tort actions for handling. See Tanoh v. Amvac Chem. Corp. (Amvac), Nos. CV
06-7038 PA (JTLx), CV 06-7059 PA (JTLx), CV 06-7067 PA (JTLx), CV 06-7043 PA
(JTLx), CV 06-7060 PA (JTLx), CV 06-7058 PA (JTLx), CV 06-7061 PA (JTLx), 2008 WL
4691004, at *1 (C.D. Cal Oct. 21, 2008). In 2008, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal
of the plaintiffs' federal claims. See Abagninin, 545 F.3d at 737-43.
177. See David Bario, Gibson Dunn Knocks Out African Pesticide Cases for Dole, THE
AMLAW LITIG. DAILY, Nov. 19, 2009, http://www.law.com/jsp/tal/
digestTAL.jsp?id=1202435667127&hbxlogin=1 (subscription required, on file with the
Fordham Law Review).
178. See id. Tanoh v. Dow Chemical Co. was dismissed amidst allegations, uncovered
and made by defense counsel, that the plaintiffs' firm, the Metzger Law Group, had
"illegally collected semen samples from Ivorian peasants and otherwise skirted the law." Id.
Metzger disputed these charges but later withdrew from the case because of ethical concerns
that the firm's lawyers "had become potential witnesses to an alleged fraud." Id. Following
Metzger's removal from the cases, the plaintiffs failed to make an appearance and the judge
dismissed their complaints. See id. Courts have dismissed claims in other DBCP cases
following similar allegations of lawyer misconduct. See generally David Hechler, The Kill
Step, AM. LAW., Oct. 2009, at 154.
179. Amvac, 2008 WL 4691004, at *5-6. In an earlier decision, the district court had
ordered remand sua sponte based on its conclusion that the nondiverse defendants were
properly joined. See Ayemou v. Amvac Chem. Corp., 312 F. App'x 24, 30-31 (9th Cir.
2008). The Ninth Circuit reversed based on its holding that the district court could not
examine the validity of the party joinder and invoke the forum defendant rule sua sponte. See
id.
180. See Amvac, 2008 WL 4691004, at *3-5. The court also rejected the defendants'
argument that the plaintiffs' motion to remand was procedurally defective. See id. at *2.
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complaints simply to avoid federal jurisdiction.' 81  The district court
declined the invitation to treat the separate claims as a single mass
action. 182 To support its decision, the court pointed both to the absence of
precedent that would support the defendants' informal consolidation of
plaintiffs' claims, as well as the general presumption against finding
removal jurisdiction. 183  Moreover, the court held that Congress had
specifically foreclosed such a consideration by excluding cases "joined
upon motion of a defendant" from the mass action definition.184 If the court
took this action that the defendants themselves were forbidden to take, it
"would effect an end-run around the limits Congress itself has imposed on
removal pursuant to CAFA." 85
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit solely addressed the CAFA numerosity
argument, and it too refused to treat the seven separate actions as a single
mass action. 186 The court first scrutinized the statute's language and intent.
The Ninth Circuit cited section two of CAFA, outlining the Act's purposes,
to conclude that it was "designed primarily to curb perceived abuses of the
class action device which, in the view of CAFA's proponents, had often
been used to litigate multi-state or even national class actions in state
courts." 187 The court, though, was not forced to rely on CAFA's intent
because, "[b]y its plain terms, [CAFA] does not apply to plaintiffs' claims
in this case, as none of the seven state court actions involves the claims of
one hundred or more plaintiffs, and neither the parties nor the trial court has
proposed consolidating the actions for trial."'188 Thus, the court did not
need to engage in a more searching examination of the plaintiffs'
complaints because applying the plain language of the statute would not be
"absurd, but rather ... consistent with both the well-established rule that
plaintiffs, as masters of their complaint, may choose their forum by
selecting state over federal court and with the equally well-established
presumption against federal removal jurisdiction."' 89 Essentially, the court
181. Id. at *5. The plaintiffs filed "one action involving 668 plaintiffs in federal court
and several separate actions involving the same plaintiffs, but in groups less than 100, in
state court." Id.
182. See id. ("Defendants cite no authority holding that plaintiffs may not file multiple
actions, each with fewer than 100 plaintiffs, to work within the confines of CAFA to keep
their state-law claims in state court and the Court declines to do so.").
183. See id. (citing Hofler v. Aetna US Healthcare of Cal., Inc., 296 F.3d 764, 767 (9th
Cir. 2002)).
184. Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(11)(B)(ii)(II) (2006)).
185. Id. (citing Lowdermilk v. U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n, 479 F.3d 994, 998-99 (9th Cir.
2007)).
186. See Tanoh v. Dow Chem. Co., 561 F.3d 945, 956 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct.
187 (2009).
187. Id. at 952 (citing Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, § 2, 119
Stat. 4, 5).
188. Id. at 953.
189. Id. (citing Lowdermilk, 479 F.3d at 998-99). For the proposition of statutory
interpretation that "when the statute's language is plain, the sole function of the courts-at
least where the disposition required by the text is not absurd-is to enforce it according to its
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concluded that Tanoh was an easy case, explicitly governed by the plain
language of the statute and requiring no great leaps of analysis to reach the
proper result.
The court further rejected the defendants' contention that the plaintiffs
were attempting to evade CAFA jurisdiction by artificially structuring their
suits, thus subverting the congressional intent underlying the Act. 190 The
Ninth Circuit first reiterated the conclusion of the district court that acting
on the defendants' suggestion to treat the actions as a single mass action
would itself violate CAFA because the court construed the defendants'
suggestion as an informal motion. 191 The court drew additional support
from the "pretrial proceedings" exception to the CAFA mass action.192
This provision indicates that "Congress intended to limit the numerosity
component of mass actions quite severely by including only actions in
which the trial itself would address the claims of at least one hundred
plaintiffs."' 93 The Tanoh court's reading of the statutory language thus
allowed little leeway for the defendants' interpretive suggestions.
Turning away from the statutory text, the court did not believe the
pleadings strategies of Tanoh were among the catalog of horribles warned
of by the Senate Report. In the class action context, the court agreed with
the defendants that CAFA was intended to curtail duplicative and
overlapping cases filed and adjudicated in multiple jurisdictions. 94 But
this was not the situation before the court:
Dow fails to explain how such concerns apply to this case, in which seven
different groups of plaintiffs, none of which purport to represent a
nationwide class, allege the same injuries in the same court .... [S]uch
concerns simply do not apply in this case, in which plaintiffs expressly
elected not to proceed as a class.195
Moreover, the court noted in an aside that the Senate Report was of little, if
any, value in analyzing CAFA since it was not printed until ten days after
CAFA's passage. 196 Ultimately, the Ninth Circuit simply did not see Tanoh
as a case of copycat litigation-as warned against by the statute. 197 The
court concluded that this duplicative litigation, rather than cases engineered
terms," the court quoted Hartford Underwriters Insurance Co. v. Union Planters Bank, 530
U.S. 1, 6 (2000). See Tanoh, 561 F.3d at 953.
190. See Tanoh, 561 F.3d at 953.
191. See id. at 953-54 ("The absence of a formal motion cannot blink away the fact
that... the defendant[] is asking us to consolidate separate actions for purposes of applying
the 'mass action' provision. A 'motion' is nothing more than 'a written or oral application
requesting a court to make a specified ruling or order,' BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1036 (8th
ed. 2004), so Dow's request precisely fits the statutory limitation.").




196. See id. at 954 n.5.
197. See id. at 954-55.
2010] 1903
FORDHAM LA W REVIEW
by the number of parties, was the gamesmanship CAFA aimed to strike
against. 198
Finally, Dow directed the court's attention to three out-of-circuit cases
that, it argued, militated against remand. 199 In each of these cases, courts
found that federal jurisdiction existed despite the plaintiffs' machinations
specifically intended to avoid CAFA's reach. Tanoh distinguished all three.
The Tanoh defendants first pointed to Proffitt v. Abbott Laboratories,200
a case involving eleven putative class actions alleging conspiracy and
anticompetitive practices intended to hold on to a monopoly on the market
of fenofibrate drugs.20 1 Each lawsuit was identical in substance but covered
a separate time period.202 By breaking up the complaint into these distinct
periods, each individual action fell below CAFA's amount in controversy
threshold.20 3  The Proffitt court asserted that the time divisions were
arbitrary and merely a "deliberate attempt" to circumvent the CAFA. 20 4
The court relied on the Senate Report and stated that CAFA should be read
as a significant expansion of preexisting federal jurisdiction over class
actions. 20 5 Courts, it reasoned, should aggressively police plaintiffs who
gerrymander their complaints to avoid CAFA's reach.206 The court held
that the eleven lawsuits before it were duplicative and arbitrary, and thus
would be treated as a single suit to determine the amount in controversy. 20 7
The court also argued that, even if it treated the suits separately at this stage,
"[u]ndoubtedly, at some point they would be consolidated for trial and
treated as one lawsuit for the purposes of judicial economy." 20 8
198. See id.
199. See id. at 955-56.
200. No. 2:08-CV-151, 2008 WL 4401367 (E.D. Tenn. Sept. 23, 2008); see Tanoh, 561
F.3d at 955-56.
201. See Proffitt, 2008 WL 4401367, at *1.
202. See id. at *2. The court also noted that similar actions were pending in Delaware
federal court and that some plaintiffs were involved in both cases. See id. at * 1.
203. See id. at *2; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2) (2006).
204. Proffitt, 2008 WL 4401367, at *2 ("The time divisions are completely arbitrary and
have no justifiable basis other than as a means to create time frames small enough to allow
the damages disclaimers as they are not warranted by the facts of the alleged conspiracy.").
205. See id. at *5 ("The intent of Congress was clear that the new § 1332(d) would
substantially broaden federal court jurisdiction over class actions.").
206. See id. at *4-5 (citing Shappell v. PPL Corp., No. 06-2078 (AET), 2007 WL
893910, at *3 (D.N.J. Mar. 21, 2007)). The court in Shappell v. PPL Corp. allowed
plaintiffs to voluntarily dismiss a claim removed under CAFA on the "condition that none of
the Plaintiffs named within the complaint may file or enter a class action in any court in the
United States on the basis of any theory of recovery stemming from the facts stated in the
complaint before this Court." Shappell, 2007 WL 893910, at *3.
207. See Proffitt, 2008 WL 4401367, at *5.
208. Id. Arguably, if these class actions were consolidated for trial in state court,
defendants could remove under the mass action provision, arguing that the classes were
made up of more than 100 people whose claims would be adjudicated at a single trial. See 28
U.S.C. § 1332(d)( 11)(B)(i).
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The Tanoh defendants also cited Freeman v. Blue Ridge Paper Products,
Inc.,209 which examined another group of class actions split up by time
period to fall below CAFA's amount in controversy requirement. 210
Indeed, the plaintiffs admitted that avoiding federal jurisdiction was the
"only reason for this structuring" 211 and agreed that this strategic gambit
would prevent them from recovering anything above the "overall limit
[demanded] for each time period. '212 Although state law appeared to allow
such claim splitting,2 13 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held
that removal was appropriate: the plaintiffs had offered "no colorable
reason for breaking up the lawsuits in this fashion, other than to avoid
federal jurisdiction."214 The court cited the Senate Report and Congress's
general intent to prevent gamesmanship and to create "efficiencies in the
judicial system by allowing overlapping and 'copycat' cases to be
consolidated in a single federal court."'215 The court also relied on Proffitt
and dismissed the plaintiffs' attempt to distinguish that case on the basis
that nuisance cases were more susceptible to splintering than conspiracy
claims. 216 Simply stated, the Sixth Circuit believed that allowing this type
of artful pleading would eviscerate CAFA as Congress intended for it to be
applied, so long as the plaintiffs could base their pleading strategy on a
footing allowed under state law.217 In these circumstances, plaintiffs had
used this pleading device to expand on their total recovery, and, because
they splintered these suits "for no colorable reason, the total of such
identical splintered lawsuits may be aggregated. '218 The dissenting judge
zeroed in on the court's "no colorable reason" standard and highlighted the
court's failure to cite authority for this criterion, "especially where ... the
filing of multiple actions is legal under state law." 219
The Tanoh court distinguished these cases for two reasons. First, in each,
considered in aggregate, the same class of plaintiffs was demanding more
than $5,000,000.220 In Tanoh, by contrast, each group of plaintiffs was
separate, meaning that no single group would collect more than the
209. 551 F.3d 405 (6th Cir. 2008); see Tanoh v. Dow Chem. Co, 561 F.3d 945, 955-56
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 187 (2009).
210. See Freeman, 551 F.3d at 407-09. In aggregate, the total amount in controversy was
$24.5 million. Id. at 409.
211. Id. at 407.
212. Id. at 409.
213. See id. at 408-09 & n. 1 (applying North Carolina law).
214. Id. at 407.
215. Id. at 408 (quoting S. REP. No. 109-14, at 5 (2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3, 6).
216. See id. at 408-09.
217. Id. at 407 ("If such pure structuring permits class plaintiffs to avoid CAFA, then
Congress's obvious purpose in passing the statute-to allow defendants to defend large
interstate class actions in federal court-can be avoided almost at will, as long as state law
permits suits to be broken up on some basis.").
218. Id. at 409.
219. Id. at 411 (Daughtrey, J., dissenting).




jurisdictional threshold.221 Second, neither Freeman nor Proffitt addressed
CAFA's mass action provision, and in neither case was the numerosity
requirement in dispute. 222 The court declined to read the cases more
broadly and quoted language from Freeman that professed to limit its
decision to claims splintered by time period. 223
The Tanoh court also summarily distinguished Bullard, the third case
cited by the defendants. 224 Although Dow argued that the Seventh Circuit's
reasoning dictated treating all the claims in Tanoh as a single mass action,
the court limited Bullard's application to claims involving more than 100
plaintiffs.225
Like the Bullard and Cooper courts, the Ninth Circuit applied a strict
reading of the statutory language to rebuff the defendants' request that
parallel cases be treated as one mass action. Unlike the cases discussed in
Part II.A, however, Tanoh supported its conclusion in part by highlighting
differences between class and mass actions. The court read the statute and
the legislative history not as conflating the two procedural devices but as
drawing distinctions between the two that the court was bound to respect.
2. Brown v. Bayer Corp. and Mobley v. Cerro Flow Products, Inc.
Shortly before this Note's publication, Tanoh's holding was echoed in
two opinions issued by Judge George Patrick Murphy of the U.S. District
Court for the Southern District of Illinois where defendants removed on the
same theory the Ninth Circuit rejected. In Brown v. Bayer Corp. ,226 five
plaintiffs brought claims in state court, alleging injuries stemming from the
use of the prescription medication Trasylol.227 The defendant removed,
arguing that the plaintiffs could be considered parties to other actions before
the district court, which, together, would constitute a mass action with 171
plaintiffs.228 The district court called this argument "ridiculous" and based
its rejection on the plain language of the statute.229 First, the district court
echoed Tanoh and reasoned that the mass action provision only reached
cases with 100 or more parties in the caption. 230 Second, the court repeated
221. See id. ("The concerns animating Freeman and Proffitt simply are not present in this
case .... [since] each of the seven state court actions was brought on behalf of a different
set of plaintiffs, meaning that none of the plaintiff groups stands to recover in excess of
CAFA's $5 million threshold between the seven suits.").
222. See id.
223. See id. at 956 (quoting Freeman, 551 F.3d at 409).
224. See id. at 956 n.6; see also supra Part II.A. 1 (discussing Bullard v. Burlington N.
Santa Fe Ry. Co., 535 F.3d 759 (7th Cir. 2008)).
225. See Tanoh, 561 F.3d at 956 n.6.
226. No. 09-989-GPM, 2010 WL 148629 (Jan. 13, 2010).
227. See id. at *1.
228. See id. at * 1-2.
229. Id. at *2.
230. See id. at *3 ("The statute provides for federal subject matter jurisdiction only as to
suits in which one hundred or more persons have joined their claims; cases involving the
claims of fewer than one hundred persons simply are not within the purview of the statute.").
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Tanoh's conclusion that acceding to the defendant's request to aggregate
these cases would trigger CAFA's exception for claims "joined upon
motion of a defendant. '231 The court also noted that although these cases
had been coordinated for proceedings in state court, that fact only made the
case look more like the exception against cases consolidated "solely for
pretrial proceedings." 232
Beyond a plain reading of the statute, the district court also held that
more traditional principles of removal jurisdiction prevented it from
retaining the case in federal court. To aggregate the claims as the defendant
desired would conflict with the tenets that a plaintiff is the master of his
complaint and that he must make a voluntary act to trigger removal
jurisdiction.233 The district court also noted that it could not consolidate a
case over which it had not already acquired subject matter jurisdiction.234
The court's reasoning, though, boiled down to a plain reading of the statute:
"as the statute now stands the removing Defendants' theory of CAFA
jurisdiction based on aggregation of the claims in this case . . . must be
rejected." 235
In the earlier case decided by Judge Murphy, Mobley v. Cerro Flow
Products, Inc.,236 the court reached the same conclusion, also based on a
strict reading of the statute. In Mobley, thirty-two plaintiffs alleged injuries
caused by the negligent release of toxic chemicals and brought suit in
Illinois state court.237 The defendants removed, arguing, as in Tanoh and
Brown, that Mobley should be consolidated with four other "identical"
actions pending in federal court.238 Judge Murphy rejected this argument.
On the question of numerosity, the court first concluded that the claims in
Mobley could only be consolidated with other cases upon a motion of the
defendants, especially "given that Plaintiffs' complaint in this case
expressly disclaim[s] any desire for consolidation of the claims in this case
with related claims."239 The judge also addressed the suggestion that he
could consolidate these cases sua sponte but concluded, without elaborating
on his reasoning, that "the Court sees no likelihood of sua sponte
consolidation here and, even if such consolidation were to occur, it likely
would be solely for pretrial purposes, which would not bring the
consolidated claims within the scope of the CAFA. '' 240  The court
231. See id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(1 1)(B)(ii)(II) (2006)).
232. See id. ("[A]ny coordination of proceedings in the state court (or, for that matter, in
federal court) actually defeats CAFA jurisdiction in this instance.").
233. See id.
234. See id.
235. Id. The court also held that the plaintiffs had not fraudulently joined a plaintiff who
was a citizen of Pennsylvania, where Bayer maintained its principal place of business. See
id. at *3-7.
236. No. 09-697-GPM, 2010 WL 55906 (S.D. I11. Jan. 5, 2010).
237. See id. at *1-2.
238. See id.
239. Id. at *3.
240. Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)( ll)(B)(ii)(IV) (2006)). In a footnote, the court
further concluded that the traditional rules of governing removal jurisdiction also eliminated
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concluded its discussion of the mass action provision by citing Tanoh, and
held that the plain language of the statute precluded the defendant's
tactic. 241
The cases discussed in this part have addressed how courts read
"proposed to be tried jointly" when asked to aggregate parties in formally
separate actions to create a single mass action. These courts have chosen to
read the mass action statute strictly, though perhaps at the expense of giving
life to Congress's broad intent. The next section turns to courts examining
the phrase "claims of ... persons," which presents additional difficulties of
interpretation.
C. Mass Actions with One Party
Bullard and Cooper presented relatively straightforward mass action
problems, and the engineered complaints of Tanoh were an inevitable result
of CAFA's inclusion of a bright-line numerosity threshold. In the
following cases, however, defendants have pressed an argument that could
dramatically expand the scope of the CAFA mass action. Creative defense
lawyers have asked courts to look past the face of the pleadings to find the
true parties in interest to a case. By including these unnamed claimants,
these defendants argue that courts can find mass actions even where only a
single plaintiff appears in the caption. In the first case discussed, the Fifth
Circuit accepted this argument and equated the case's "true parties in
interest" with CAFA's "claims of ... persons." Courts that have decided
similar arguments have universally not found federal jurisdiction, though
not all have rejected the Fifth Circuit's analysis of this question.
1. Louisiana ex rel. Caldwell v. Allstate Insurance Co.
In Louisiana ex rel. Caldwell v. Allstate Insurance Co., 2 4 2 the Fifth
Circuit accepted the defendant's invitation to look past the labels used by
the plaintiff in its pleadings and found a hidden mass action, despite the fact
that the action involved only a single plaintiff. The dispute at issue in
Caldwell concerned an alleged conspiracy among several insurance
companies, the consulting firm McKinsey & Company, and an information
management company to illegally undervalue and underpay the claims of
Louisiana policyholders. 243 Louisiana's Attorney General, aided by four
the possibility of CAFA jurisdiction: that the plaintiff is the master of his complaint, that a
court can only consolidate cases properly before it, and that removal jurisdiction is construed
narrowly. See id. at *3 n.2; see also supra notes 233-35 and accompanying text. The court
also held that CAFA's "event or occurrence" exception foreclosed federal jurisdiction. See
Mobley, 2010 WL 55906, at *3 ("[I]t is undisputed that Plaintiffs in this case are suing in
Illinois on claims that arose in Illinois.").
241. See Mobley, 2010 WL 55906, at *3 (citing Tanoh v. Dow Chem. Co., 561 F.3d 945,
952-56 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 187 (2009)).
242. 536 F.3d 418 (5th Cir. 2008).
243. See id. at 421-23.
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private plaintiffs' law firms,244 brought a parens patriae action in state
court seeking injunctive relief, forfeiture of illegal profits, and treble
damages on behalf of policyholders. 245 Simultaneously, the plaintiffs'
firms were pursuing "nearly identical claims" in purported class actions
filed in federal court.246 The defendants removed, asking the U.S. District
Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana to look past the labels applied by
the Attorney General and recognize the suit as one satisfying CAFA's
jurisdictional requirements: "although labeled parens patriae, this case is
in substance and fact a 'class action' or a 'mass action' as those terms are
used in CAFA . ...-247 The defendants' primary argument was that this
case was a class action masquerading as a parens patriae suit, not that
behind the plaintiffs labels lay a mass action.248  The defendants
highlighted the parallel class action proceedings in federal court to buttress
its assertion.249
The district court agreed with the defendants, concluding that it could not
take the plaintiffs pleadings at face value, but instead must "look at the
substance of ... the complaint. '250 The State, according to the court, was
merely a nominal party and the true parties in interest were more than 100
Louisiana policyholders, giving the court jurisdiction under CAFA.251
Before the Fifth Circuit could determine whether the case was in fact a
mass action, it had to pierce the complaint and look behind the single
named plaintiff who brought the suit.252  The court cited the "well-
established" rule that "federal courts look to the substance of the action and
not only at the labels that the parties may attach" in order to determine
whether jurisdiction exists.253 When appropriate, the court concluded,
"'defendants may pierce the pleadings to show that the ... claim has been
fraudulently pleaded to prevent removal."'' 254 Notably, the cases the court
cites are not entirely on point.255 The first case it cites, Grassi v. Ciba-
Geigy, Ltd.,256 specifically addresses the assignment of claims with the
intent of destroying diversity jurisdiction, but Caldwell uses Grassi to
244. See id. at 421 & n.2.
245. See id. at 423.
246. See id.
247. Id. (emphasis added).
248. See id. at 435 (Southwick, J., dissenting) ("[E]ven if this suit should be a class action
(as the Defendants argue) or a mass action (as the majority concludes), there is no
jurisdiction until the suit has indeed been brought under a Rule 23 equivalent or as a mass
action in state court.").
249. See id. at 423.
250. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
251. See id.
252. See id. at 424-25.
253. Id. at 424 (citing Grassi v. Ciba-Geigy, Ltd., 894 F.2d 181, 185 (5th Cir. 1990)).
254. Id. at 424-25 (quoting Burchett v. Cargill, Inc., 48 F.3d 173, 175 (5th Cir. 1995)).
255. See Georgene Vairo, CAFA and AG Suits, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 24, 2008, at 25 ("While
it is true that there are occasions when courts 'pierce the pleadings' to determine whether a
party is improperly seeking to create or destroy jurisdiction, the cases the 5th Circuit relied
on do not support it.").
256. 894 F.2d 181.
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support a broader license to read past the face of the complaint. 257 The
second, Wecker v. National Enameling & Stamping Co.,258 dealt with the
question of fraudulent joinder of defendants. 259 The final case the court
relied on, Burchett v. Cargill, Inc.,260 was equally narrow and limited its
inquiry to fraudulent pleading of the Jones Act, 261 which cannot be
removed from state court. 262 The court in Burchett limited its analysis to
the Jones Act and analogized it to fraudulent joinder of defendants. 263 The
Fifth Circuit mooted its own analysis, however, because the State had
waived its right to contest this issue by failing to raise any objection to the
district court's decision to pierce the complaint. 264
The Fifth Circuit then turned to the question of parens patriae actions
and reviewed their purposes and limits. At the heart of both, the court
stated, is the State's sovereignty.265 The inherent powers of the sovereign
give the State authority to bring suit. 266 Because of the source of its
authority, the State's standing is limited to cases "asserting an interest that
relates to its sovereignty. '267 One class of issue that would not provide
parens patriae standing is "private interests pursued by the state, where the
state is only acting as a nominal party. '268 But a state may pursue a parens
patriae action to "vindicate a 'quasi-sovereign interest,"'' 269 a difficult-to-
define term that turns on whether the alleged injury affects a "'sufficiently
substantial segment of [the State's] population.' ' 270 If the State's action
asserted a quasi-sovereign interest, then it would be the real party in
interest. 271
257. Compare Grassi, 894 F.2d at 185 ("We accordingly hold that federal district courts
have both the authority and the responsibility, under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332 and 1441, to
examine the motives underlying a partial assignment which destroys diversity and to
disregard the assignment in determining jurisdiction if it be found to have been made
principally to defeat removal."), with Caldwell, 536 F.3d at 424 ("It is well-established that
in determining whether there is jurisdiction, federal courts look to the substance of the action
and not only at the labels that the parties may attach."). On assignment intended to destroy
diversity jurisdiction, see generally 13F CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE
& PROCEDURE § 3641 (3d ed. 2009).
258. 204 U.S. 176 (1907).
259. See id. at 185. See generally 13F WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 257, § 3641.1.
260. 48 F.3d 173 (5th Cir. 1995).
261. Merchant Marine Act of 1920 (Jones Act), Pub. L. No. 66-261, § 33, 41 Stat. 988,
1007 (codified as amended at 46 U.S.C. § 30104 (2006)). The Jones Act allows for personal
injury actions by seamen. See id.
262. See 28 U.S.C. § 1445(a); Burchett, 48 F.3d at 175.
263. See Burchett, 48 F.3d at 175-76.
264. See Lousianna ex rel. Caldwell v. Allstate Ins. Co., 536 F.3d 418, 425 (5th Cir.
2008) (citing Chambers v. Mukasey, 520 F.3d 445,448 n.I (5th Cir. 2008)).
265. See id. at 425-27.
266. See id. at 425.
267. Id. (citing Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. P.R. ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 600-01
(1982)).
268. Id. at 426 (citing Snapp, 458 U.S. at 601-02).
269. Id. (quoting Snapp, 458 U.S. at 601).
270. Id. (quoting Snapp, 458 U.S. at 607).
271. See id. at 428-30.
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The conflict in Caldwell centered upon the State's demand for treble
damages. 272 As a threshold matter, the parties contested whether the
Attorney General had any authority to demand treble damages under
Louisiana's Monopoly Act or whether this right was limited to injured
parties.273 However, the court simply assumed that the State had this
authority, stating that the issue of authority to bring suit was not relevant to
the question of who was the true party in interest.274 Because "individuals
have the right to enforce this provision .... the policyholders, and not the
State, are the real parties in interest [on the claim for treble damages]. '275
While the State could sue for treble damages where it itself is the
policyholder,276 in this case, Louisiana sought to "recover damages suffered
by individual policyholders."277 The State's own pleadings revealed this
fact, according to the court, with its numerous references to "insureds" and
"policyholders." 278  The purpose of treble damages-to incentivize
individual suits-also bolstered the court's reasoning. 279 Thus, the court
concluded that the State was merely a cipher in its request for treble
damages: the true parties in interest were the individual, injured
policyholders who were not formally parties to the suit. 280
The Fifth Circuit did its analytical heavy lifting to conclude that
Louisiana policyholders-not the Attorney General-were the true parties
in interest to the suit. In the remainder of its opinion, it breezed through the
272. See id. Many courts in similar cases have chosen not to examine claims individually
but instead look at the complaint as a whole to determine who the real party in interest is.
See, e.g., Illinois v. SDS West Corp., 640 F. Supp. 2d 1047, 1051-52 (C.D. Ill. 2009);
Wisconsin v. Abbott Labs., 341 F. Supp. 2d 1057, 1062-63 (W.D. Wis. 2004). But see
Connecticut v. Levi Strauss & Co., 471 F. Supp. 363, 370-71 (D. Conn. 1979) (determining
citizenship separately by relief requested). None of these courts styles its inquiry as
"piercing the complaint," but they do scrutinize its "'essential nature and effect."' SDS West,
640 F. Supp. 2d at 1050 (quoting Nuclear Eng'g Co. v. Scott, 660 F.2d 241, 250 (7th Cir.
1981)).
273. See Caldwell, 536 F.3d at 429-30. Louisiana's Monopoly Act is codified at LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 51:121-:152 (2003). The Act authorizes "[a]ny person" injured by a
violation to request treble damages. See id. § 51:137. The State has general authority to
bring claims under the act. See id. § 51:138 ("All suits for the enforcement of this Part shall
be instituted ... by the Attorney General, on his own motion or by direction of the governor,
or by the district attorney, acting under instruction of the governor or Attorney
General ... ").
274. See Caldwell, 536 F.3d at 429-30.
275. Id. at 429 (citing Louisiana ex rel. Guste v. Fedders Corp., 524 F. Supp. 522, 557
(M.D. La. 1981)).
276. See id. at 429 n.8.
277. Id. at 429.
278. See id. at 429 n.9 ("[T]he petition is rife with statements that make clear that the
policyholders are the real parties in interest in this action.").
279. See id. at 430.
280. See id. The fact that the policyholders were the true parties in interest also effected a
waiver of the State's Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity. See id. at 430-32 (citing
Louisiana v. AAA Ins. (In re Katrina Canal Litig. Breaches), 524 F.3d 700, 711 (5th Cir.
2008)); see also U.S. CONST. amend. XI. Louisiana v. AAA Ins. (In re Katrina Canal
Litigation Breaches) was a putative class action with the State and numerous Louisiana
citizens the plaintiffs. See In re Katrina Canal Litig. Breaches, 524 F.3d at 702.
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application of this holding to CAFA's jurisdictional rules. 28 1 But rather
than relying on the statute's test, the court primarily drew on the Act's
legislative history. The Fifth Circuit particularly highlighted the Senate
Report's instruction that "the term 'class action' . . . be defined broadly to
prevent 'jurisdictional gamesmanship.' ' 282 The court further noted that the
Senate had considered and rejected an amendment that would have
exempted class actions filed by attorneys general from CAFA's scope. 283
Without much ado, the court summarily concluded that CAFA applied to
the case before it.
Having determined that the policyholders are real parties in interest, we
agree that... this is a civil action involving the monetary claims of 100 or
more persons that is proposed to be tried jointly on the ground that the
claims involve common questions of law or fact . . . and it is being
brought in a representative capacity on behalf of those who allegedly
suffered harm. 284
The court's analysis here depends on its unstated equating of "real party
in interest" 285 with "claims of ... persons. '286 The real party in interest is
the party that "possesses the right sought to be enforced. ' 287 In this case,
the "persons" possessing the claims are not the parties actively asserting
them. Under the circumstances, the absent persons could be nonparty
claimants, but this status also involves the active assertion of claims.288
281. See Caldwell, 536 F.3d at 430.
282. Id. at 424 (quoting S. REP. No. 109-14, at 35 (2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3, 34). The court also cited Congress's intent that CAFA as a whole be interpreted liberally.
See id. (quoting S. REP. No. 109-14, at 35, reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 34); see also
supra note 56 and accompanying text.
283. See id. at 424 & n.4. The amendment, proposed by Senator Mark Pryor, would have
exempted "any civil action brought by, or on behalf of, any attorney general." 151 CONG.
REC. S1157 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 2005) (statement of Sen. Pryor). Senator Pryor was
particularly concerned that CAFA could sweep parens patriae actions that are brought in the
form of class actions into federal court. See id. at S 1159 (statement of Sen. Pryor). CAFA's
supporters argued that the Act would not affect the rights of attorneys general to bring suits,
and also highlighted the dangers of private plaintiffs' attorneys pressing these types of suits
on behalf of states. See, e.g., id. at S 1163 (statement of Sen. Grassley) ("Plaintiffs' lawyers
could simply ask State attorneys general to lend their name to a class action lawsuit so as to
keep them in the State court."). The amendment's opponents also noted fundamental
differences between parens patriae suits and class actions. See id. (statement of Sen. Hatch)
("But let me be perfectly clear that they are not class actions."). The amendment was voted
down sixty to thirty-nine. See id. at S 1165 (roll call vote).
284. Caldwell, 536 F.3d at 430 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(1 1)(B)(i) (2006)).
285. Cf FED. R. Civ. P. 17(a).
286. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(1 1)(B)(i).
287. CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & MARY KAY KANE, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 70, at
492-93 (6th ed. 2002). Wright and Kane note that courts often confuse the concept of real
party in interest with the question of standing in the context of government action. See id.
§ 70, at 492 n.2.
288. The Principles of the Law of Aggregate Litigation implicitly support this
assumption in their definition of nonparty claimants as "persons asserting ... claims," that
is, as persons actively asserting their rights, although not necessarily within the confines of
formal litigation. See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION § 1.01(c)-(d) &
cmts. c-c (Proposed Final Draft 2009).
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The court did not acknowledge or support this assumption, and the terms do
not necessarily overlap in full.289 Moreover, the Senate Report does not
discuss, or even mention, real parties in interest.290 Nor did this concept
arise during debate in the House or Senate.291 Interestingly, "real party in
interest" was mentioned in the legislative history of previous versions of
CAFA, but only with respect to class actions.292 In sum, the connection
between "real party in interest" and the mass action is not immediately
plain.
Because the case came before the Fifth Circuit with only a single party,
the court noted that its ruling would require the district court to add
individual policyholders to make the action a mass action.293 The court
abstained from considering how this was to be accomplished-a task best
left to the "capable hands" of the district judge. 294 The circuit court also
left open the possibility that the State could sever its claims and ask that its
request for injunctive relief be remanded to state court.295
In dissent, Judge Leslie Southwick rejected the court's construction of a
mass action without a mass. The court, in the dissent's eyes, did not have
any subject matter jurisdiction over the case, and thus its inquiry should
have ended before it attempted to transform the suit into something it was
not.296 Louisiana had not brought the case as a formal class action and in
its present state it was not yet a mass action.297 Even if the dissent went
along with the court's conclusion that the State was merely a nominal
plaintiff, that would merely present a "defective pleading under Louisiana
law." 298 Transforming the suit into a mass action improperly forced the
Attorney General to proceed in a posture he did not elect, challenging the
presumption that the plaintiff is the master of his own complaint.299
289. See Caldwell, 536 F.3d at 430. On the confusion raised by the term "persons," see
supra notes 114-20 and accompanying text.
290. See S. REP. No. 109-14 (2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3.
291. This assertion is based on a search of the congressional record, as assembled in
Arnold and Porter Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, available on Westlaw.
292. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 108-144, at 42 (2003) ("When a class action is filed,
however, only the named plaintiffs and their counsel have control over the choice of forum;
the vast majority of the real parties in interest-the unnamed class members on whose behalf
the action is brought and the defendants have no voice in that decision.").
293. See Louisiana ex rel. Caldwell v. Allstate Ins. Co., 536 F.3d 418, 430 (5th Cir.
2008).
294. See id. ("We leave to the district judge's capable hands the manner by which the
individual policyholders are to be added to this action. Once again, we need not extend our
appellate hands into matters that the district court is well-able to address.").
295. See id.
296. See id. at 432-35 (Southwick, J., dissenting).
297. See id. at 433.
298. Id. at 434.
299. See id. at 433-34 ("But even when looking underneath the pleadings to discern the
true nature of the suit, we begin with the proposition that the plaintiff is the master of his
complaint; all contested issues of fact and 'any ambiguity or uncertainty in the controlling
state law' must be resolved against the party who seeks removal based upon a claim that the




Moreover, the dissenter believed federal court was the wrong forum in
which to tease out the complexities of Louisiana's Monopoly Act and the
Attorney General's ability to seek treble damages.300 For these reasons,
Judge Southwick would have remanded the case and let the state courts
determine the proper way to proceed.30 1
The Caldwell court's decision pointedly does not examine the statutory
language in depth, and relies primarily on the license granted by the Senate
Report. It also seems to depend on an equivalence between class and
nonclass cases, allowing it to force the creation of a mass action from a case
with only a single plaintiff. Although its mode of analysis is starkly
different from that of the courts discussed in Parts II.A and II.B, the court is
fundamentally dealing with a similar problem-rationalizing the realities of
aggregate litigation with an ambiguous statute. The cases examined in the
next section take up this same question but with divergent results.
2. After Caldwell: Adoption and Dissent
Most courts that have responded to similar arguments as those in
Caldwell have rejected the call to pierce the complaint and manufacture a
CAFA mass action. This section examines three such cases. None of these
cases reaches the same result as Caldwell. Two courts have rejected
Caldwell's analysis outright, even expressed alarm at its connotations, but
one has shown itself willing to expand the idea of the mass action.
In Kitazato v. Black Diamond Hospitality Investments, LLC,30 2 despite
the fact that the court reached the opposite result from that in Caldwell, the
U.S. District Court for the District of Hawaii accepted at least the premise
of the Fifth Circuit's holding. Kitazato concerned three individuals and the
Society to Protect Diamond Hawaii who jointly brought a number of claims
in state court against a resort and related parties. None of these claims were
for money damages. 30 3 The defendants removed based on the argument
that the Society was a representative plaintiff and that the true plaintiffs in
the action numbered more than 100-in short, that this was another mass
action in disguise. 304 A magistrate judge recommended remand, first,
because CAFA mass actions and the Ninth Circuit under Tanoh do not
allow representative plaintiffs; second, because even if that were not the law
of the circuit, defendants could not show that more than 100 persons
brought the suit; and, third, because CAFA mass actions must be claims for
monetary relief.305
300. See id. at 435-36 ("The state court's ruling on that motion and any interlocutory
appeals that might be permitted would be dispositive on the issues before us and would not
be Erie guesswork.").
301. See id. at 436.
302. No. 09-00271 DAE-LEK, 2009 WL 3824851 (D. Haw. Nov. 13, 2009).
303. See id. at *4-5.
304. See id. at *3-4.
305. See id. at* 1-3.
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The district court agreed with this final conclusion.306 Although the
relief sought by the plaintiffs could result in cost to the defendants, "[b]y its
plain language, CAFA limits mass actions to suits seeking monetary relief
and does not extend to actions seeking solely equitable or declaratory
relief. '307 Although the court could have remanded on this ground-and
also suggested that the case may fall under the mass action "event or
occurrence" exception 3 8-the court also examined the case under the
numerosity requirement.
With only four named plaintiffs, the removing defendants zeroed in on
the Society to Protect Diamond Hawaii and argued that it was a
representative plaintiff; taking this into account, more than 100 persons
were bringing claims. 309 Both the magistrate judge and the district court
disagreed and held that "a mass action does not allow for a plaintiff's
representation of other persons in a manner identical to that of a class
action." 310 But class representation was not an issue presented to the court,
it averred, because the plaintiffs had not pleaded their claims as a formal
class action.311 Instead, the court reasoned that the constitution of the
Society itself provided an exception to this general prohibition because "an
association may sue in a representative capacity on behalf of its members if
it meets certain standing requirements." 312
The Supreme Court has recognized that an association has standing to
assert claims on behalf of its members if
(a) its members would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right;
(b) the interests it seeks to protect are germane to the organization's
purpose; and (c) neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested
requires the participation of individual members in the lawsuit.
313
Federal courts had interpreted this third requirement as constitutionally
prohibiting associations from seeking monetary relief on behalf of their
members because such claims would require the participation of individual
members.314 However, the Supreme Court held subsequent to Hunt that
"the third prong of the associational standing test is best seen as focusing on
306. See id. at *4-6.
307. Id. at *5.
308. See id. at *6; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(1 1)(B)(ii)(I) (2006); supra notes 79, 89-
93 and accompanying text.
309. See Kitazato, 2009 WL 3824851, at *3-4. The defendants argued that the Society
represented approximately 490 individual parties. See Kitazato v. Black Diamond Hospitality
Invs., LLC, No. 09-00271 DAE-LEK, 2009 WL 3209298, at *6 (D. Haw. Oct. 6, 2009)
(findings and recommendation of magistrate judge).
310. Kitazato, 2009 WL 3824851, at *3.
311. See id.
312. See id. (citing Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Adver. Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 342-43
(1977)). In adopting this line of reasoning, the court disregarded the recommendation of the
magistrate judge. See Kitazato, 2009 WL 3209298, at *6 (findings and recommendation of
magistrate judge).
313. Hunt, 432 U.S. at 343.
314. See United Food & Commercial Workers Union Local 751 v. Brown Group, Inc.,
517 U.S. 544, 553-54 (1996).
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these matters of administrative convenience and efficiency, not on elements
of a case or controversy within the meaning of the Constitution. '315 The
Court's prime concern was that representative suits result in properly
adversarial actions. 316 Thus, administrative standing does retain many
features common to a representative plaintiff.
The Kitazato district court reasoned that the Society's ability to assert
representative claims aligned this case with Caldwell, which the court cited
as "instructive, although not binding authority. '317 The Court reasoned that
the Society acted as a proxy in place of its membership and that those
constituent members were the "real parties in interest" in the suit.318
Although the court adopted the Fifth Circuit's reasoning from Caldwell, it
did not reach the same conclusion; even including the Society's members,
the 100 person threshold was still not reached. 319
The court in Kitazato did not use the Fifth Circuit's Caldwell ruling in
order to keep this case in federal court, but it did adopt the Circuit's
reasoning, agreeing that a court must look behind the names in the caption
to determine the true nature of the action.320 The district court also adopted
Caldwell's conflation of real party in interest with claims proposed to be
tried jointly. The court's reasoning is especially interesting because the
case came down in the wake of Tanoh-binding precedent for that court. 321
While Tanoh established a seemingly strict rule-to focus solely on the
case caption and ignore any subjective arguments that might warrant
piercing the complaint-the Kitazato court did not feel constrained to
consider the parties in interest merely facially. The district court's sub
silentio acceptance of Caldwell's analysis demonstrates that courts may be
willing to unmoor the mass action from its strict foundations.
Other courts asked to equate "claims of ... persons" with real parties in
interest have declined to follow the trail blazed by Caldwell. In California
Public Employees Retirement System v. Moody's Corp. (CalPERS),322 the
U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California fully agreed with
the Kitazato magistrate judge's earlier report and recommendation and
315. Id. at 557. In this case, the Court determined that the Worker Adjustment and
Retraining Notification Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2101-2109 (2006), authorized a Union to seek
monetary damages representationally on behalf of its members. See United Food, 517 U.S.
at 558.
316. See United Food, 517 U.S. at 558 ("If these provisions for representative actions
were generally resulting in nonadversarial actions that failed to resolve the claims of the
individuals ultimately interested, their disservice to the core Article III requirements would
be no secret.").
317. Kitazato, 2009 WL 3824851, at *3.
318. See id. at *4.
319. See id. (stating that the court could count "no more than 52 persons with an interest
in the underlying litigation in the instant case").
320. See id.
321. See id at *3 (citing Tanoh v. Dow Chem. Co., 561 F.3d 945 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
130 S. Ct. 187 (2009)).
322. Nos. C 09-03628 SI, C 09-03629 JCS, 2009 WL 3809816 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 10,
2009).
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limited "claims of . . . persons" to formal parties.323 The plaintiff in
CalPERS was California's government retirement administrator that was
suing a credit rating agency for negligently giving their highest grade to
three Structured Investment Vehicles. 324  The retirement fund's
beneficiaries numbered more than 1.6 million.325 The court summarily
found that CalPERS itself, not any of its beneficiaries, was the sole
plaintiff, and thus the case could not, by definition, be deemed a mass
action.326 The court entirely disagreed with the reasoning behind Caldwell,
which it did not cite, in its reading of the mass action provision and its
legislative history:
[T]he Senate Committee Report for CAFA defines "mass actions" as
"suits that are brought on behalf of numerous named plaintiffs who claim
that their suits present common questions of law or fact that should be
tried together even though they do not seek class certification status."
This action does not fall within this definition because it does not concern
numerous named plaintiffs who are electing to try their claims
together. 327
CalPERS demonstrates both the unwillingness of this court to accept
Caldwell's reasoning and the fact that CAFA's legislative history does not
ineluctably lead to an expansion of the mass action in the eyes of all judges.
In a third case, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New
York rejected the most sweeping attempt to expand Caldwell's approach to
mass actions. Anwar v. Fairfield Greenwich Ltd.328 involved several cases
filed in state court in the wake of the collapse of Bernie Madoff s infamous
Ponzi scheme. 329 The claims at issue in Anwar concerned the Fairfield
Greenwich Group, an umbrella corporation that managed, maintained, and
advised a range of investment funds.330 Several of these funds directed
billions of dollars to Bernard Madoff, collecting investment management
fees over the years but losing everything once the scheme was revealed.
Anwar consolidated four cases-three derivative suits brought on behalf of
funds managed within the Fairfield Greenwich Group and one direct suit-
each of which, the defendants claimed, was a CAFA mass action.
331
Although the derivative claims were brought by, at most, two individual
partners or shareholders, the defendants argued that, like in Caldwell, the
323. See id. at *6-7.
324. See id. at * 1.
325. See id.
326. See id. at *7.
327. See id. (quoting S. REP. No. 109-14, at 46 (2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3,
43)).
328. Nos. 09 Civ. 0118, 09 Civ. 2366 (Ferber), 09 Civ. 2588 (Pierce), 09 Civ. 5012
(Morning Mist), 09 Civ. 5650 (Sentry), 2009 WL 5103234 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 23, 2009). This
decision adopted in full a report and recommendation of a magistrate judge as its ruling. See
id. at *2.
329. See Anwar, 2009 WL 5103234, at *4.
330. See id.
331. See id. at *1, *5.
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court should count the "beneficial equity holders," rather than the named
plaintiffs, and find a CAFA mass action.332
The court declined this invitation. Even assuming that each fund had at
least 100 beneficial equity holders, the judge found no support in CAFA's
language or legislative history for the defendants' arguments.333 First, the
court read CAFA's plain language as entirely unsupportive of the
defendants' claims.334 The court also read CAFA's legislative history as
strictly limiting mass actions to traditional mass joinder claims and, even
more specifically, to states without an analog to Rule 23 class actions.335
Although the magistrate judge could not rely on them, the district court
noted that Kitazato and CalPERS buttressed these conclusions. 336
Moreover, plaintiffs' derivative suits were neither examples of artful
pleading nor of a "'class action in disguise"' 337 and thus were entitled to the
traditional deference plaintiffs receive as masters of their complaint.338
Ironically, the court used Caldwell to support remand, rather than CAFA
jurisdiction: "[h]ere, as in Caldwell, the state statutes giving a shareholder
or limited partner authority to bring a derivative action designate the
corporate entity as the 'real party in interest."'' 339 If the Fifth Circuit in
Caldwell pierced the complaint to find more than 100 parties, the district
court here found only a single entity, the corporation, behind the named
plaintiffs. 340
332. Id. at *7. The magistrate judge had earlier allowed limited discovery to determine
whether the 100-party threshold was satisfied for some of the plaintiffs. See Anwar v.
Fairfield Greenwich Ltd., No. 09 Civ. 0118(VM)(THK), 2009 WL 1181278, at *2-4
(S.D.N.Y. May 1, 2009). In doing so, the magistrate judge rejected Lowery v. Alabama
Power Co., 483 F.3d 1184, 1215-18 (11 th Cir. 2007), which disallowed limited discovery to
determine jurisdiction.
333. See Anwar, 2009 WL 5103234, at *8 ("In order to adopt the expansive reading of
CAFA proposed by Defendants, the Court must be persuaded, at the very least, that there is
some language in the statute, legislative history, or relevant case law that supports such an
interpretation. Indeed, there is none.").
334. See id.
335. See id. at *10. In reaching this conclusion, the court relied on the Senate debate and
stated, "CAFA's legislative history makes clear that Congress envisioned 'mass actions' as
claims by multiple plaintiffs 'consolidated by State court rules,' but not otherwise pled as
class actions. More specifically, Congress drafted the 'mass action' provision of CAFA
primarily to cover actions brought by multiple plaintiffs in states such as Mississippi that 'do
not provide a class action device."' Id. (citing 151 CONG. REc. S1151 (daily ed. Feb. 9,
2005) (statement of Sen. Reid); 151 CONG. REC. S1081 (daily ed. Feb. 8, 2005) (statement of
Sen. Lott)).
336. See id. at *2 n.2. But see supra notes 320-21 and accompanying text (noting that
Kitazato v. Black Diamond Hospitality Investments, LLC adopted the reasoning of Louisiana
ex rel. Caldwell v. Allstate Insurance Co.).
337. Anwar, 2009 WL 5103234, at *10.
338. See id. at *9 ("Derivative Plaintiffs-as well as plaintiffs in any action-are the
'master[s] of the complaint,' free to 'preclude removal by electing to disregard an available
federal dimension of a claim."' (quoting Segal v. Varonis Sys., Inc., 601 F. Supp. 2d 551,
552 (S.D.N.Y. 2009))).
339. Id. at*ll.
340. See id. ("Defendants have, in fact, argued-and, in effect, conceded-that individual
investors in the Funds have no right to bring a direct action." (citing Letter to the Court from
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The court similarly dismissed the same argument used against a direct
claim by the investment fund Fairfield Sentry Ltd.341 This direct action
alleged injury to the corporate entity itself and thus "belongs exclusively to
the corporation." 342  The court was particularly concerned that, if the
defendants were able to transform such a direct action into a CAFA mass
action, "'literally any company, public or private, with more than 100
shareholders could be deprived of its chosen forum and haled into federal
court."' 343 The judge declined to transform a derivative action into a mass
action solely because of the presence of more than 100 shareholders.
As in CalPERS, the Anwar court refused to cobble together a mass action
from a complaint with a few plaintiffs or only a single plaintiff. Yet, the
district court ironically, and perhaps only rhetorically, used Caldwell's
complaint-piercing to find against CAFA jurisdiction.
The four cases discussed in this section all evidence a tension between
arguments based on a strict reading of CAFA's language, specifically
"claims of ... persons," and a broader reading aided by the Senate Report.
Caldwell and Kitazato also show that some courts have elided over any
distinction between class and mass actions, using representative plaintiffs as
an invitation to seek out 100 parties. Courts have not yet followed Caldwell
en masse, but as Kitazato and even Anwar show, judges may be more
receptive to the Fifth Circuit's reasoning than the results in these cases
suggest.
D. Three Ways To Count to 100
This part has examined three questions that derive from ambiguities in
the language of the CAFA mass action provision. These problems begin
Mark G. Cunha at 7 n.7, Anwar v. Fairfield Greenwich Ltd., Nos. 09 Civ. 0118, 09 Civ.
2366 (Ferber), 09 Civ. 2588 (Pierce), 09 Civ. 5012 (Morning Mist), 09 Civ. 5650 (Sentry)
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 9, 2009)). The judge also rejected an argument by the defendants that
CAFA's "absence of an enumerated exclusion for derivative actions," read in contrast to the
Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-353, 112 Stat. 3227
(codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.), meant that Congress intended derivative suits to
fall within CAFA's scope. See Anwar, 2009 WL 5103234, at *11. The judge insisted that
Congress did not need to clarify in CAFA "what is obvious in black letter law-that a
corporate party to a lawsuit is considered one entity or person." Id. at * 12.
341. See Anwar, 2009 WL 5103234, at *4 & n.5 (detailing the liquidation of the fund and
the substitution of the fund's liquidator as plaintiff, which the judge declared irrelevant to the
motion to remand).
342. Id. at *13 (citing Bank of Am. Corp. v. Lemgruber, 385 F. Supp. 2d 200, 224
(S.D.N.Y. 2005)).
343. Id. (quoting Memorandum of Fairfield Sentry Ltd. at 2, Anwar v. Fairfield
Greenwich, Ltd., Nos. 09 Civ. 0118, 09 Civ. 2366 (Ferber), 09 Civ. 2588 (Pierce), 09 Civ.
5012 (Morning Mist), 09 Civ. 5650 (Sentry) (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 23, 2009)); see also Sarah S.
Gold & Richard L. Spinogatti, Madoff Litigation Tests Limits of Removal Under CAFA, N.Y.
L.J., Feb. 10, 2010, at 3 ("As a matter of statutory construction, the Anwar decision is sound.
The court was certainly correct in pointing out that derivative actions brought in a
company's name are distinct from direct investor actions .... CAFA is not the vehicle for




with textual ambiguity but also stem from fundamental similarities between
class and nonclass aggregate litigation, as well as the broad intent voiced by
Congress in the Senate Report-a source that not all courts accept as
authoritative. Two lines of cases-Bullard and Cooper, and Tanoh-have
adopted strict readings of the statute, even if the result contradicted the
presumed intentions of CAFA's drafters. In the third line of cases-
Caldwell, Kitazato, CalPERS, and Anwar-the tensions among the
statutory language, statutory intent, and nature of aggregate litigation stand
out even more strikingly. CAFA was designed to capture cases of "national
importance," and the mass action provision was founded on the idea that
some nonclass cases involving multiclaimant disputes are "class actions in
disguise." Yet applying the statute's ambiguous language can leave some
disguised class actions in federal court and, at the same time, can leave
fractured mass actions in federal court. The reasoning employed by the
courts discussed above shows that, as currently written and practiced, the
numerosity requirement will continue to breed uncertainty as litigants battle
over the extent of the device. In Part III, this Note proposes readings of
CAFA's statutory ambiguities that attempt to resolve the issues presented
by the ambiguous statutory language.
III. COUNTING TO 100: A LIMITED READING OF THE MASS ACTION
PROVISION
The cases discussed in Part II all reveal that ambiguities in the language
of CAFA's mass action provision make counting to 100 a far more difficult
endeavor than would be expected. Specifically, the phrases "claims of ...
persons" and "proposed to be tried jointly" open themselves up to
competing interpretations. In Bullard and Cooper, courts concluded that
joining more than 100 plaintiffs to a single complaint satisfied CAFA's
requirement that claims must be "proposed to be tried jointly."'344 The latter
case also held that subsequent machinations by the defense could not
destroy a mass action once it had been created-even if it goes forward in
100 or more separate trials. 345 In Tanoh, seconded by the recent cases of
Brown and Mobley, courts have applied a similarly strict reading of the
statute to plaintiffs who join fewer than 100 parties.346 These courts have
properly rejected the arguments made by defendants to recognize that
separate actions, none of which individually constitutes a mass action,
together satisfy the statute's requirements. Finally, in Caldwell and the
cases that followed it, courts offered differing interpretations of CAFA's
phrase "claims of ... persons." 347 The Fifth Circuit in Caldwell equated
this term with the "real parties in interest" whose interests were being
advanced by the Louisiana Attorney General, but who were not formal
344. See supra Part II.A.
345. See supra notes 152-70 and accompanying text.
346. See supra Part II.B.
347. See supra Part II.C.
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parties to the suit.348 The court in Kitazato seemed to adopt this reasoning,
but did not find a mass action as Caldwell had.349 These courts glossed
over any distinction between these two terms and, as a result, opened the
door to CAFA's "claims of ... persons" having far wider connotations than
are appropriate. In Anwar and CalPERS, courts closed the door on this
reading of the statute. 350 Anwar especially acknowledged that if defendants
succeeded in equating CAFA's persons with "real parties in interest,"
nearly any case involving, for example, a corporation with 100 or more
shareholders, would be subject to the mass action provision.351 These two
cases were correct to forestall this line of argument.
All of these cases show that creative lawyers for both defendants and
plaintiffs have been able to make the clear number 100 far from clear in
application. Their arguments stem primarily from the statute's ambiguous
language, 352 but expansive readings of CAFA have also taken license from
the legislative history, which indicates Congress's clear intent that the mass
action reach as broadly as possible. 353 These arguments also depend on
fundamental similarities between class and nonclass aggregate litigation-
similarities that prompted Congress to enact the mass action statute in the
first place. 354 The confluence of these three factors makes the numerosity
requirement a bone of contention as parties dispute whether their case is
subject to federal jurisdiction.
This Note suggests a reading of the statute's two key terms-"claims
of... persons" and "proposed to be tried jointly"-that aims to clarify the
task of counting to 100 and that best rationalizes the statute, its legislative
history, and the similarities between class and nonclass aggregate litigation.
As to "claims of . . . persons," courts should read this phrase to apply
strictly to formally joined parties. This reading of the statute best comports
with the entirety of CAFA's text, as well as the intentions of Congress. As
to "proposed to be tried jointly," courts should limit their inquiry to formal
parties to a single action, or to claims that have formerly and properly been
consolidated for trial. This proposal does lead to the bizarre results in
Tanoh and Cooper, where cases with ninety-nine plaintiffs remained in
state court, while, in federal court, a mass action could conceivably result in
100 separate trials. Of the bad options, this reading best accommodates the
statute as a whole, the intent of Congress, and the traditional rule that the
plaintiff is the master of his complaint. However, what these readings show
above all is that the very complexity and fluidity of aggregate litigation that
spawned the mass action provision has also proved its undoing: the mass
action numerosity provision is unworkable in practice.
348. See supra notes 281-92 and accompanying text.
349. See supra notes 302-21 and accompanying text.
350. See supra notes 322-43 and accompanying text.
351. See supra notes 333-43 and accompanying text.
352. See supra Part I.C.3.
353. See supra Part I.C.2.
354. See supra Part I.A; notes 85-87 and accompanying text.
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A. "Claims of... persons"
1. Cases Examining "Claims of... persons": Caldwell, Kitazato, Anwar,
and CalPERS
CAFA's "persons" is a term open to nearly endless interpretations, and in
Caldwell, the Fifth Circuit pushed its meaning to the limit. Although it did
not elaborate, or even acknowledge its crucial assumption, the Caldwell
court could not reach its conclusion without equating the "real parties in
interest" to a parens patriae suit with the statute's phrase, "claims of...
persons. '355 While Caldwell did not cite CAFA's language, the cases it
relied on are instructive. The Fifth Circuit discussed "real party in interest"
within the context of parens patriae cases-cases that did not deal with
CAFA. 356 The "real parties in interest" in those suits possessed the rights
asserted, but were not parties that actively consent to litigation.357
This conclusion also relied on the court's ability to look past the labels
the plaintiff had applied to its complaint, a decision that at least one
commentator has criticized. 358 However, this decision was less striking in
the context of other parens patriae suits. Even courts that disagreed with
the Fifth Circuit's bifurcation of the real party-in-interest inquiry based on
the relief sought probed into the meat of the complaint. 359 Nevertheless, the
Caldwell court overstated the case law supporting its decision.360
Caldwell's conflation of CAFA's "persons" with the "real parties in
interest" of a parens patriae suit allowed the court to order a remarkable
procedure to govern the case going forward. Faced with only one
representative party-the State-the Fifth Circuit ordered the district court
to add individual plaintiffs as appropriate.361 The circuit court thus dictated
the transformation of the litigation from the form chosen by the plaintiff
into a radically different one. If the court was correct in its conclusion that
the State had no standing to pursue its claims for damages, surely the more
appropriate outcome would be to dismiss those claims and allow the
plaintiff to determine how to replead them-as a mass action or as a
class. 362 Indeed, everything about Caldwell resembled a class action more
than a mass action: it was a case with a representative plaintiff advancing
the interests of absent parties. 363  The defendants agreed with this
conclusion and appeared to argue more strenuously that the case was a
disguised class, not a disguised mass. 364  Although the Fifth Circuit
355. See supra notes 284-92 and accompanying text.
356. See supra note 272.
357. See supra note 271.
358. See supra notes 252-64 and accompanying text.
359. See supra note 272.
360. See supra notes 255-64 and accompanying text.
361. See supra notes 293-95 and accompanying text.
362. Cf supra note 298.
363. See supra notes 20, 23-26, 275-80 and accompanying text.
364. See supra notes 247-49 and accompanying text.
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downplayed the ramifications of its decision by deferring to the district
court on the quotidian matters of case management, Caldwell was a
remarkable instance of court intrusion into the structure of litigation. 365
This stealth certification was founded on the court's unspoken conflation of
the ambiguous mass action language with the "real parties in interest" that
stood behind the single plaintiff in the action.
Kitazato repeated Caldwell's conflation of a representative plaintiff with
the "persons" who constitute a mass action. 366 Like the Fifth Circuit, the
Kitazato court pierced the complaint and equated the real parties in
interest-the members of the plaintiff Society-with CAFA's term, "claims
of ... persons." 367 As with the Attorney General in Caldwell, the Society
in Kitazato seems more like a class plaintiff than a mass of parties, but as in
Caldwell, the district court seemed willing to entertain the case before it as
a mass action.368 Although the court looked to the members of the society
as a mass, it should more appropriately think of them as a class.
Anwar and CalPERS provided needed checks on a defendant's desire to
search out parties in interest.369 The arguments the defendants advanced in
Anwar and CalPERS are natural heirs to the arguments the Fifth Circuit
accepted in Caldwell and show how far the mass action would reach if it
counted all "real parties in interest." Anwar and CalPERS were correct to
limit their inquiries to the parties in the case caption and forestall the
breathtaking potential reach of Caldwell's reading of "claims of . . .
persons." 370
In addition to potentially making mass action jurisdiction apply to, for
example, all corporations with 100 shareholders, Kitazato and Caldwell
dangerously transformed what seemed to be class actions into mass actions,
essentially agreeing to certify a class, but outside of the confines of Rule
23.371 This extension conflicts with the mass action statute's exception for
cases that have been certified as formal class actions.372 The Kitazato and
Caldwell courts ignored this conflict and took their license to act from the
365. See supra notes 293-95 and accompanying text.
366. See supra notes 311-19 and accompanying text.
367. See supra notes 317-18, 320 and accompanying text.
368. See supra notes 317-19 and accompanying text.
369. See supra notes 327, 333-43 and accompanying text.
370. Anwar v. Fairfield Greenwich Ltd., Nos. 09 Civ. 0118, 09 Civ. 2366 (Ferber), 09
Civ. 2588 (Pierce), 09 Civ. 5012 (Morning Mist), 09 Civ. 5650 (Sentry), 2009 WL 5103234
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 23, 2009), however, was incorrect to conclude that the mass action provision
was intended only to apply to states without an analog to Rule 23 class actions. See supra
note 335 and accompanying text. During debate, Senator Lott did refer to the experience of
Mississippi, which did not have a class device, to argue on behalf of the mass action
provision. See supra note 92. But neither he, nor any of CAFA's supporters, ever indicated
that the mass action was intended to fill such a narrow gap. The argument that the mass
action should simply apply to states without a class action rule comes from CAFA's
opponents who latched on to the rhetorical devices of the bill's supporters. See id. The mass
action device does fill the gap of states without class actions, but it was never intended to be
limited to this application.
371. See supra notes 23-26 and accompanying text.
372. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
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broad intent contained in the Senate Report, as well as from recognition that
class and nonclass litigation share many common characteristics. 373 But
above all, these two courts reached their conclusions because of the
ambiguous phrase "claims of ... persons."
2. "Claims of ... persons" Should Be Limited to Parties
As the cases above demonstrate, CAFA's "persons" is a woefully
imprecise term. To rectify this ambiguity, courts should interpret the mass
action statute to apply only to "claims of" parties. 374 This interpretation of
the statute is the most appropriate for several reasons. First, limiting
"persons" to parties would harmonize this phrase with the remainder of the
mass action provision, which exclusively uses the term "plaintiffs. '375
Second, this reading aligns with the presumptions of Congress, which also
used "plaintiffs," not "persons," in its discussion of the mass action
provision. 376 Third, this interpretation removes the possibility of conflict
with the mass action's prohibition against cases that have been formally
filed as class actions. 377 Additionally, reading "persons" to encompass
"parties" is preferable to an interpretation of the term as applying solely to
"plaintiffs. '378 Parties can join a case in more ways than formal joinder as
plaintiffs, such as through intervention. 379 "Party" better captures the full
complexity of aggregate litigation, which does not always proceed with
neatly aligned parties.
Past the statute's language and Congress's intent, this interpretation
would eliminate the possibility, raised by Caldwell, that mass actions could
be used to stealthily create class actions without the judicial scrutiny that
device requires. 380  "Parties" must consent to litigation-a choice that
distinguishes them from the much broader "real parties in interest" that the
Caldwell court used to create a mass action without a mass. 381 Courts
under this proposed interpretation would be prevented from searching for
"100 or more persons" at second or third degrees of remove from the
claimants actually before the court.
373. See supra Part I.C.2; notes 40-42 and accompanying text.
374. This interpretation could also be codified by an amendment to the statute to read
"claims of 100 or more parties."
375. See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
376. See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
377. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
378. See supra note 119 and accompanying text (discussing the difficulty of creating a
vocabulary for aggregate litigation).
379. See supra notes 27-33 and accompanying text.
380. See supra notes 361-65 and accompanying text.
381. See supra notes 23-26, 36-39 and accompanying text.
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B. "Proposed to be tried jointly"
1. Cases Examining "Proposed to be tried jointly": Bullard, Cooper, and
Tanoh
Although an appropriate reading of CAFA's "persons" is possible based
on reference to the statute as a whole and Congress's intent, it is more
difficult to resolve the more obvious question raised by the numerosity
requirement-how to interpret "proposed to be tried jointly." Courts have
not yet produced a satisfying answer. The solution reached in Tanoh placed
a strict reading of the statute above Congress's intent for the statute to be
broadly construed. 382 Tanoh also ignored the realities of the problems of
nonclass aggregation: a case with ninety-nine plaintiffs will not present
different concerns of due process than a case with 101 plaintiffs. 383 Despite
Tanoh's unsatisfying result, this Note argues that, considered as a whole, it
is inappropriate to expand the scope of the "proposed to be tried jointly"
inquiry outside of the formal bounds of a single action.
The analysis of "proposed to be tried jointly" begins with Bullard. On
the strict facts of the case, the Seventh Circuit certainly reached the correct
result. At its heart, the court's ruling was a simple and strict application of
the plain language of the statute, which easily encompassed this case.
Bullard was correct to conclude that joining more than 100 parties to a
single complaint satisfies the mass action's "proposed to be tried jointly"
requirement. However, Chief Judge Easterbrook's final dictum takes a
dramatic leap outside the facts presented and would potentially transform a
huge swathe of informally aggregated actions into mass actions. 384 Based
on his reasoning, defendants could argue that the proposed use of
bellwether trials to help price a larger number of claims fits with the Chief
Judge's conception of a mass action. 385 In a way, the Chief Judge is not far
off base. Such informally aggregated actions may not be bound by strict
rules of preclusion, but a decisive verdict for one side or the other can work
a similar effect.386 In this way, the court's reasoning is grounded on the
fundamental similarities between class and nonclass aggregate litigation: a
realization shared by Congress and essential to its creation of the mass
action provision. Yet, taken most broadly, Bullard's dictum would likely
have transformed Tanoh, and many other cases, into CAFA mass actions.
The Ninth Circuit rejected this result.
Considered apart from the 100-person requirement of the mass action
device, though, Tanoh was as easy a case as Bullard. The claims as a
whole involved over 600 people.3 87 Their injuries occurred in Western
382. See supra notes 188-93 and accompanying text.
383. See supra notes 36-39 and accompanying text.
384. See supra note 145 and accompanying text.
385. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
386. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
387. See supra note 174 and accompanying text.
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Africa-on the other side of the world from the state court in Los
Angeles.388 DBCP litigation was ongoing in multiple states in both state
and federal courts involving the same large multinational corporations as
defendants. 389  The Tanoh plaintiffs were even involved in parallel
litigation in the state and federal systems in California.390 If CAFA was
intended to bring cases of national importance into federal court in order to
ensure the free flow of interstate commerce, Tanoh would seem to fall
squarely within its ambit. 391
Yet, Tanoh was remanded to state court, and the Ninth Circuit reached
this result simply by applying the statute as written. 392 The Ninth Circuit's
reasoning verges on tautology-there are fewer than 100 plaintiffs because
no one action has more than 100 plaintiffs-but based on a plain reading of
the statute and the complaints, Tanoh was a correct result.
However, in order to reach this result, the Tanoh court needed to
willfully ignore the reality that these cases were a single action in all but the
form of the pleadings. Each involved the same plaintiffs' lawyer, the same
defendants, and the same facts. 393 In the claims originally brought in
federal court, all plaintiffs were joined in a single mass joinder action. 394
Moreover, the district court judge that presided over the federal action had
the various state actions transferred to him after removal. 395 Although he
ordered their remand, the district judge was engaging in some informal
aggregation of his own.
The Ninth Circuit also limited the applicability of Freeman and Proffitt
more than strictly required. 396 Unlike in Tanoh, both cases involved claims
seeking more than $5,000,000 for the same class of plaintiffs, but each
court heavily emphasized CAFA's intent to cut down on duplicative,
artificially structured suits-not simply on suits that skirt the amount in
controversy threshold.397 Tanoh relied on the language from Freeman
limiting its holding to situations where plaintiffs seek to expand on, rather
than limit, their recovery, 398 but the majority of the opinion in Freeman
focused on the court's determination that the structuring had "no colorable
basis" other than to avoid CAFA's jurisdiction. 399 Proffitt's reasoning was
even more sweeping. The court there argued generally for expanded federal
jurisdiction over class actions and cited several cases that did not examine
388. See supra notes 174-75 and accompanying text.
389. See supra notes 174, 178.
390. See supra note 176 and accompanying text.
391. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
392. See supra notes 188-89 and accompanying text.
393. See supra notes 174-78 and accompanying text.
394. See supra note 176 and accompanying text.
395. See supra note 176.
396. See supra notes 200-23 and accompanying text.
397. See supra notes 204, 208, 214-15 and accompanying text.
398. See supra notes 220-21 and accompanying text.
399. See supra notes 211-15, 217-18 and accompanying text.
THREE PROBLEMS WITH COUNTING TO 100
the amount in controversy requirement.400 Duplication of claims, it held,
was the evil against which CAFA aimed, and that gerrymandering should
prevent plaintiffs from artificially structuring their complaints.401 Although
these cases were class actions that centered on different sections of CAFA,
their reasoning could extend to Tanoh.
By dismissing Bullard in a footnote, the Tanoh court also skirted the
potentially all-encompassing scope of Chief Judge Easterbrook's dictum.402
Had one of the state court actions gone before a jury, that case would surely
exert some preclusive effect on the parallel actions.403  While this
preclusion may not have been formal, a jury result would certainly affect
the terms of any settlement.404 Taking Easterbrook's dictum beyond the
Bullard facts-and perhaps beyond the judge's own intent-one trial of
fewer than 100 plaintiffs would, in fact, try the claims of the larger class.
Tanoh's result is especially perverse in light of the result in Cooper.
While Tanoh concluded with multiple cases with fewer than 100 parties in
state court, Cooper could result in more than 100 trials of only a single
plaintiff in federal court.40 5 But Cooper reached its conclusion based on a
similar strict reading of the statute.40 6 The court recognized this potentially
bizarre result but claimed its conclusion was compelled by CAFA's plain
language. 407 Cooper also demonstrated that, as much as CAFA's authors
and supporters decry sordid gamesmanship on the part of plaintiffs'
counsel, defense lawyers are just as capable of manipulating statutory
language to their benefit. 408
2. "Proposed to be tried jointly" Should Be a Limited Inquiry
Tanoh and Cooper each reached results that seem nonsensical given the
broad intent behind the mass action provision. This reading is not fully
satisfying, but among several poor choices, it is the least bad.
First, the presumptions displayed by Congress point towards a limited
reading of "proposed to be tried jointly." CAFA's supporters in Congress
explicitly stated that a single complaint would satisfy the "proposed to be
tried jointly" component. 409 Along with Congress's use of the term
"plaintiffs" in its discussion of the mass action, this legislative history
supports a limited reading of this term. However, these supporters did not
state that this joinder was a necessary requirement for mass action
400. See supra notes 204-08 and accompanying text.
401. See supra note 206 and accompanying text.
402. See supra notes 145, 224-25 and accompanying text.
403. See supra notes 41-42 and accompanying text.
404. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
405. See supra notes 152-59 and accompanying text.
406. See supra note 156 and accompanying text.
407. See supra notes 169-70 and accompanying text.
408. See supra notes 49-53, 85-87 and accompanying text.
409. See supra notes 121-25 and accompanying text.
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jurisdiction.4 10 The Senate Report aggressively signaled its intent that
courts read CAFA's language more broadly wherever possible and urged
courts not to rely solely on the labels parties apply to their suits in
determining whether federal jurisdiction exists. 411 Were a court to follow
this edict in Tanoh, it would surely conclude that the suits compromised a
single mass action.
However, this type of analysis conflicts with two of CAFA's clear
exclusions-"claims that have been consolidated or coordinated solely for
pretrial proceedings" and claims that have been "joined upon motion of a
defendant. '412 The former exception precludes courts from creating a mass
action simply because the parties are cooperating on discovery across
several separate actions. The mass action's restriction on further transfer to
MDL proceedings without the majority of the plaintiffs' consent further
echoes this exception. 413
A court that wished to follow Congress's broad intent and aggregate
multiple actions into one mass action would likely base its decision on the
fact that the several actions would, in fact, proceed as a single case. Factors
contributing to this conclusion would likely include common
representation, shared discovery, consolidated briefing, and other pretrial
matters common across the several actions. However, the statute expressly
forbids creating a mass action out of cases "coordinated solely for pretrial
proceedings." Thus, attempting to follow Congress's broad intent under
these circumstances would conflict with a strict reading of the statute as a
whole.
To find a mass action under the Tanoh circumstances, a court must also
address the statute's exception for claims "joined upon motion of a
defendant." In Tanoh, the Ninth Circuit concluded that mere removal based
upon the argument that a court should find a mass action is, itself, a defense
motion, albeit a second-hand one.4 14 Even if a court were to treat the
removal as an opportunity to consolidate claims sua sponte, it would run
into additional procedural hurdles. 415 If the court admits that it only has
subject matter jurisdiction over the mass action postconsolidation, then
arguably the individual "actions" were never properly "before the court. '4 16
The court in Brown and Mobley properly acknowledged these procedural
roadblocks and declined to consider ordering consolidation sua sponte when
it did not have jurisdiction over the underlying actions. 417
410. See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
411. See supra notes 54-58, 85-93 and accompanying text.
412. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(l 1)(B)(ii), (iv) (2006); see also supra notes 80-82 and
accompanying text.
413. See supra notes 83-84 and accompanying text.
414. See supra note 191 and accompanying text.
415. See supra note 31.
416. See supra note 3 1.
417. See supra notes 233-34, 239-40 and accompanying text. However, removing
defendants can respond to these issues with arguments founded on additional ambiguous
statutory language. CAFA prohibits mass actions from being cobbled together out of claims
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Limiting the "proposed to be tried" inquiry to claims that have been
formally pleaded together or properly consolidated also retains the
traditional rule that a plaintiff is "master of his own complaint."'418 The
Brown and Mobley court recognized this traditional tenet and declined to
allow an expansive reading of CAFA to override this concern. 419
Yet, the reading adopted in Tanoh and Cooper, and advanced by this
Note, still does not satisfy. Tanoh was clearly a case of national
importance, as CAFA's framers envisaged, but does not fall under this
interpretation of the mass action provision.420 Congress created the mass
action provision to capture cases that presented the same problems as class
actions but, because of the creativity of enterprising lawyers, did not
proceed as formal classes.421 Again, Tanoh is a clear example of clever
structuring to avoid federal jurisdiction. The same creativity that gave rise
to the mass action provision, however, makes the numerosity requirement
essentially unworkable. Practitioners foresaw the problem presented in
Tanoh shortly after CAFA's enactment. Ironically, the creativity of defense
lawyers raised equally difficult issues in Cooper.422 However, reading
CAFA to encompass the claims in Tanoh, Brown, and Mobley goes against
the language of the statute as a whole. These courts reached the correct, if
unsatisfying, result.
CONCLUSION
Congress passed CAFA's mass action provision firmly believing that
these nonclass aggregate proceedings were simply "class actions in
disguise." 423  To curb the abuses that it saw in this form of litigation,
Congress plainly signaled its intent to sweep as many of these actions as
possible into federal court. However, Congress embodied its broad intent
and realization about the similarities between class and nonclass actions
within a deeply ambiguous statute. The wording of the mass action
provision makes even the seemingly simple task of counting to 100 a matter
for argument and litigation. This Note has examined cases that have
pressed differing interpretations of the number 100 as applied to potential
"joined upon motion of a defendant," but this section, unlike the statute's pretrial
proceedings exception, does not use the term "consolidate." See supra note 31 and
accompanying text. This distinction opens the door to an argument that CAFA precludes
federal jurisdiction for claims or parties joined under Rules 19 or 20, but not claims that are
consolidated upon a motion of the defendant under Rule 42. See supra notes 28, 31 and
accompanying text. Although Rule 42 does use the term "join," the language used in the
mass action provision is just another example where unclear terms could give rise to
competing statutory interpretations. See supra Part I.C.3.
418. See supra notes 233-34, 240 and accompanying text.
419. See supra notes 235, 241 and accompanying text.
420. See supra notes 54-55, 174-78 and accompanying text.
421. See supra notes 85-87 and accompanying text.
422. See supra note 172 and accompanying text.
423. S. REP. No. 109-14, at 47 (2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 44; see also
infra note 85 and accompanying text.
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mass actions. Having surveyed these cases, as well as the statute and its
background, this Note argues for a strict reading of CAFA's numerosity
requirement. Courts should count only parties, and only parties to a single
action, when they inquire if a case satisfies the mass action numerosity
requirement. This reading is not ideal, but it is the best among bad options.
The interpretation of the numerosity requirement that this Note advances
would allow plaintiffs to remain in state court with parallel claims of
ninety-nine parties, but could also result in "mass actions" that result in
over 100 separate trials in federal court. These bizarre results only
demonstrate that the realization that prompted the creation of the mass
action device is truer than Congress realized. In many ways, nonclass
actions are "class actions in disguise"; however, the very malleability that
drew Congress's attention also renders any attempt to capture these forms
of litigation with a clear, round number impossible. In the context of the
CAFA mass action device, there is no one way to count to 100.
